We are Multilingual OSINT.
http://ferrint.com/osint

Can anyone vouch for the Criminal Intelligence Training that AGC
gives?

Mike
Houston

Hi,

I got a mail from www.techieindex.com about virtual conference, DW
summit. On www.sas.com announced Data Mining Technology Conference.
Any one knows any other conferences? Is it helpful?

Alex

Please find in the next posting an article by Steve Marrin
<spm8p@...> who cites himself as a former CIA
analyst and student of the intelligence process currently working on
my dissertation at the University of Virginia.

The article is titled "Improving CIA Analysis by Overcoming
Institutional Obstacles" and was recently published in a compilation
book "Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best
Practices" edited by Russell Swenson and put out by the Joint
Military Intelligence College. The article looks at how institutional
practices can prevent full utilization of lessons learned in
training, education, or other knowledge-building endeavors, and the
approach used--focusing on how expertise is both acquired and lost by
various organizational or procedural mechanisms--can be applied to
the study of knowledge within any institution.

For CIA case studies I assess both the dissolution of CIA's Office of
Leadership Analysis and the changing emphasis on current versus long-
term intelligence, and in the end argue that organizational and
procedural modifications may be necessary to improve the CIA's
analytic output. Specifically, I recommend that CIA re-constitute its
Office of Current Intelligence and Office of Research and Reports to
take advantage of individual analysts' cognitive strengths.

ADCI Mark Lowenthal wrote the foreword to the book, and there are a
number of other interesting articles in it as well that address
various aspects of intelligence (contents copied below). The book
citation isn't on the JMIC website yet, but I assume it will be
shortly. If you have any questions or comments, please let me know.
Regards,
Steve Marrin
(spm8p@...)


Further info on JMIC publication:
Swenson, Russell G., Editor. "Bringing Intelligence About:
Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices." Center for Strategic
Intelligence Research, Joint Military Intelligence College. May 2003.

Contents:
* Mark M. Lowenthal--Foreword
* Russell G. Swenson--Introduction
* Pauletta Otis--The Intelligence Pro and the Professor: Toward an
Alchemy of Applied Arts and Sciences
* John Turner--Via the Internet
* F.G. Satterthwaite--Visit to Mazagon Dockyard, Bombay
* Stephen Marrin--Improving CIA Analysis by Overcoming Institutional
Obstacles
* Thomas A. Garin--Appraising Best Practices in Defense Intelligence
Analysis
* David T. Moore and Lisa Krizan--Core Competencies for Intelligence
Analysis at the National Security Agency
* Lt. Michael E. Bennett, USCG--The U.S. Coast Guard Joins the
Intelligence Community

I was perusing the software stores of the world and found this site.
Look at the companies these folks are helping.  Lots of good stuff
here.

Mike

http://www.inqtel.com

Marrin, Stephen. "Improving CIA Analysis by Overcoming Institutional
Obstacles." Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on
Best Practices. Russell G. Swenson, Editor. Center for Strategic
Intelligence Research; Joint Military Intelligence College. May 2003.
40-59.



IMPROVING CIA ANALYSIS BY OVERCOMING INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES

Stephen Marrin
spm8p@...

The accuracy of CIA intelligence analysis depends in part upon an
individual analyst's expertise, yet programs implemented to increase
this expertise may not be sufficient to increase the accuracy of
either an individual's analysis or the institution's output as a
whole.  Improving analytic accuracy by increasing the expertise of
the analyst is not easy to achieve.   Even if expertise development
programs were to result in greater regional expertise, language
capability, or an improved application of methodological tools, the
production process itself still takes place within an institutional
context that sets parameters for this expertise.  The agency's
bureaucratic processes and structure can impede an analyst's
acquisition and application of additional expertise, preventing the
full realization of the potential inherent in expertise development
programs.  Therefore, any new reform or program intended to  improve
analytic accuracy by increasing the expertise of its analysts should
be supplemented with complementary reforms to bureaucratic processes--
and perhaps even organizational structure--so as to increase the
likelihood that individual or institutional improvement will occur.

The interplay between analyst and institution within the Intelligence
Community remains poorly studied. As Columbia University's Robert
Jervis has observed, "perhaps the intelligence community has paid too
[little attention] …to how the community's internal structure and
norms might be altered to enable intelligence to be worth listening
to."  CIA's intelligence production may be subject to improvement,
but making that a reality requires a sophisticated understanding of
how an analyst operates within the Directorate for Intelligence's
[DI's] institutional context.  However, empirical verification of
this hypothesis is impossible since, as Jervis notes, "[r]igorous
measures of the quality of intelligence are lacking" and are
insurmountably difficult to create.    Under these circumstances,
this essay is a conceptual "what-if" exploration into the interplay
between the acquisition and application of expertise on three levels:
that of the individual, bureaucratic processes, and organizational
structure.


THE GOAL: IMPROVING CIA'S ANALYSIS


Improving the accuracy of CIA's finished intelligence products could
make an immediate and direct improvement to national security
policymaking as well as reduce the frequency and severity of
intelligence failures. The CIA's  DI—like other intelligence agencies-
-ideally provides policymakers with "timely, accurate, and objective"
finished intelligence analysis tailored to the needs of the national
security policymaker.  In the author's experience and observation, a
DI analyst interprets the international environment through an
information processing methodology approximating the scientific
method to convert raw intelligence data into finished analysis. The
traditional "intelligence cycle" describes how an analyst integrates
information collected by numerous entities and disseminates this
information to policymakers. As William Colby—former Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) and veteran operations officer--notes, "at
the center of the intelligence machine lies the analyst, and he is
the fellow to whom all the information goes so that he can review it
and think about it and determine what it means."  Although this model
presents this process in sequential terms, more accurately the
analyst is engaged in never-ending conversations with collectors and
policymakers over the status of international events and their
implications for U.S. policy. As part of this process, intelligence
analysts "take the usually fragmentary and inconclusive evidence
gathered by the collectors and processors, study it, and write it up
in short reports or long studies that meaningfully synthesize and
interpret the findings," according to intelligence scholar Loch
Johnson.

Intelligence failures of every stripe from the trivial to the vitally
important occur every day for a variety of reasons, including the mis-
prioritization of collection systems, hasty analysis, and
inappropriately applied assumptions. In the mid-1970s Richard Betts
effectively settled the academic question of causes of failure by
arguing that intelligence failures will be inevitable due to many
inherent limitations in the analytic process.  Administrators at the
Joint Military Intelligence College note that "analysis is subject to
many pitfalls--biases, stereotypes, mirror-imaging, simplistic
thinking, confusion between cause and effect, bureaucratic politics,
group-think, and a host of other human failings."  Yet most
intelligence failures do not lead to direct negative consequences for
the U.S. primarily because the stakes of everyday policymaking are
not high, and errors in fact and interpretation can be corrected as
the iterative process between intelligence and policy develops. As a
result, most failures or inaccuracies are eventually corrected and
usually never even noticed. However, sometimes intelligence failure
is accompanied by either great policymaker surprise or serious
negative consequences for U.S. national security, or both.

The CIA's May 1998 failure to warn American policymakers of India's
intentions to test nuclear weapons is an illustration of both  kinds
of failure. This lapse--widely criticized by foreign policy experts
and the press--highlighted intelligence limitations such as the DI's
inability to add together all indications of a possible nuclear test
and warn top policymakers. According to New York Times correspondent
Tim Weiner, these indicators included "the announced intentions of
the new Hindu nationalist government to make nuclear weapons part of
its arsenal, the published pronouncements of India's atomic weapons
commissioner, who said…that he was ready to test if political leaders
gave the go-ahead, and …missile tests by Pakistan that all but dared
New Delhi to respond."  CIA's inability to integrate these indicators-
-a failure of analysis--led to charges of "lack of critical thinking
and analytic rigor."  Admiral David Jeremiah—who headed the official
investigation into the failure—concluded that intelligence failed to
provide warning in part because analysts "had a mindset that said
everybody else is going to work like we work," otherwise known as
mirror-imaging.  He then "recommended hiring more analysts, improving
their training and increasing contact with outside experts to
challenge conventional wisdom," according to The Wall Street
Journal's Carla Robbins.

CIA's search for ways to improve analytic accuracy and prevent
intelligence failure—if successful—could have a positive impact on
national security policymaking.  The CIA is arguably the centerpiece
of the United States' thirteen-agency intelligence community (IC)
and "has primary responsibility for all-source intelligence analysis
in the [IC] and the preparation of finished national intelligence for
the President and his top policymakers," according to former CIA
Inspector General Fred Hitz.  If CIA analysis does have this kind of
central role in influencing policy, improving its accuracy should
provide policymakers with the opportunity to create or implement
policies that more effectively protect national security and advance
national interests.


THE METHOD: INCREASING ANALYTIC EXPERTISE


Improving the capabilities and knowledge of the individual CIA
analystthrough programs reflecting Admiral Jeremiah's recommendations
is one way to improve the accuracy of intelligence analysis. An
analyst's expertise—defined as "the skill of an expert,"   is a
crucial component for the production of accurate intelligence
analysis. "In the lexicon of US intelligence
professionals, `analysis' refers to the interpretation by experts of
unevaluated [`raw'] information collected by the [IC]," according to
Loch Johnson.  The presumption is the more "expert" an analyst is the
more accurate the resulting interpretation will be. In May 2000, DCI
George Tenet described the importance of an analyst's expertise in
this manner:

In our [DI] it is not enough just to make the right call. That takes
luck. You have to make the right call for the right reasons. That
takes expertise. It is expertise—built up through study and
experience—that combines with relevance and rigor to produce
something that is very important: insight….[O]ur analysts blend a
scholar's mastery of detail with a reporter's sense of urgency and
clarity. At its best, the result is insight. And it is insight that
wins the confidence of our customers and makes them want to read our
publications and listen to our briefings."

Analytic expertise is a multi-faceted concept because CIA uses a
complex web of analytic specialties to produce multi-disciplinary
analysis. Not hired by the CIA or even the DI, most analysts are
hired by the individual DI offices and assigned to "groups" that
cover specific geographic areas, and are then assigned a functional
specialty—"discipline" or "occupation" in DI terminology—such as
political, military, economic, leadership, or scientific, technical,
and weapons intelligence, according to CIA's website.  An analyst's
expertise can vary depending on his or her relative degree of
regional knowledge, familiarity with disciplinary theory, and with
intelligence methods in general:

· Regional expertise is essentially area studies: a combination
of the geography, history, sociology, and political structures of a
defined geographic region. The DI's regional officesare responsible
for an analyst's regional expertise and develop it by providing
access to language training, regional familiarization through
university courses, or in-house seminars.
· Disciplinary expertise relates to the theory and practice
that underlies the individual analytic occupations. For example,
economic, military,  political and leadership analysis are  built on
a bed of theory derived from the academic disciplines of economics,
military science, political science, and  political psychology,
respectively. Disciplinary expertise can be acquired through previous
academic coursework, on-the-job experience, or supplementary training.

For the most part each CIA analyst possesses a very small area of
direct responsibility defined by a combination of regional area and
discipline as they work in country teams with analysts of other
disciplines and interact with other regional or disciplinary
specialists as the need arises. CIA's small analytic niches create
specialists, but their specialties must be re-integrated in order to
provide high-level policymakers with a bigger picture that is more
accurate and balanced than that arising from the limited perspective
or knowledge of the niche analyst. This process of re-integration—
known as "coordination" in DI parlance—allows analysts of all kinds
to weigh in with their niche expertise on pieces of finished
intelligence before they are disseminated. According to CIA analyst
Frank Watanabe: "We coordinate to ensure a corporate product and to
bring the substantive expertise of others to bear."  Accordingly, the
bureaucratic norm is for an analyst to make every effort to
coordinate a draft with other analysts in related regional or
disciplinary accounts prior to submitting the draft to management for
editing and dissemination. As a result, whereas the expertise of the
primary drafter of the piece usually has primary influence on the
accuracy of the final piece, the coordination process exerts a strong
influence as well.

Insufficient analytic expertise can cause inaccuracies in
intelligence analysis. Robert Jervis points out that "a grav[e]
danger lies in not having sufficient expertise about an area or  a
problem to detect and interpret important trends and developments. To
make up for such deficiency, analysts tend to impose on the
information the concepts, models, and beliefs that they have derived
elsewhere."  In addition, in 1991 former DCI Stansfield Turner noted
that "[a]nother reason for many of the analytic shortcomings is that
our analytical agencies do not have an adequate grasp of the cultures
of many countries with which we must deal."  Seven years later the
CIA failed to provide policymakers with warning of India's nuclear
tests for this very reason. To bolster CIA's weaknesses, in 1991
Turner suggested that analysts should be provided with "a better
opportunity to attend academic institutions, participate in
professional conferences, travel and live abroad, acquire language
skills and thus become true experts in their areas."  Yet in 1998
former CIA officer Robert Steele observed that "[t]he average analyst
has 2 to 5 years' experience. They haven't been to the countries
they're analyzing. They don't have the language, the historical
knowledge, the in-country residence time or the respect of their
private-sector peers," as reported by Tim Weiner.

CIA has recently implemented programs to increase analytic
expertise.  In 2000, then-Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) and
current Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) John
McLaughlin created the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis,
which was "designed to give new employees a rigorous, 26-week
overview of intelligence analysis"   as well as provide training in
CIA's analytic disciplines to officers of all levels.  In addition,
McLaughlin said that CIA is "going all out to achieve greater
analytic depth. We are providing incentives for analysts to stay on
their accounts longer. We are affording our analysts greater
opportunities to travel and to broaden their experience. Because we
claim no monopoly on wisdom, we are bringing in outside experts for
short tours as scholars-in-residence. We also are encouraging our
analysts to expand their contacts with specialists elsewhere in
government, in the private sector and in academia."

Increasing expertise may not be sufficient to produce accuracy or
prevent failure.  As Jervis notes, "experts will [not] necessarily
get the right answers.  Indeed, the parochialism of those who know
all the facts about a particular country that they consider to be
unique, but lack the conceptual tools for making sense of much of
what they see, is well known."  In addition, "[e]ven if the
organizational problems...and perceptual impediments to accurate
perception were remedied or removed, we could not expect an enormous
increase in our ability to predict events" because "(t)he impediments
to understanding our world are so great that… intelligence will often
reach incorrect conclusions."  That is because human cognitive
limitations require analysts to simplify reality through the analytic
process, but reality simplified is no longer reality. As a
result, "even experts can be wrong because their expertise is based
on rules which are at best blunt approximations of reality. In the
end any analytic judgment will be an approximation of the real world
and therefore subject to some amount of error"   and analytic
inaccuracies—and sometimes intelligence failure—will be inevitable.
Therefore, although increasing expertise is a goal, it cannot be the
only goal for increasing DI capabilities.

Nevertheless, the DI leadership has created multiple expertise
development initiatives to counter perceptions of analytic inadequacy
and increase the DI's core capability--its analytic expertise. The
unanswered question is whether the analyst can acquire and apply
relevant expertise within the institutional constraints of the DI.


FIRST INTERVENING FACTOR: BUREAUCRATIC PROCESSES


Bureaucratic processes can impede the acquisition or application of
expertise gained in expertise development programs, thereby limiting
any potential improvement in overall analytic accuracy. The DI is a
bureaucracy, and like every bureaucracy creates "standard operating
procedures" (SOPs) which are necessary for efficient functioning but
over time usually prove to be rigid in implementation.  As former DDI
Doug MacEachin noted in 1994: "We have all been a part of what has
been good and of what needs changing. Some of the practices needing
change came into being as the unforeseen result of efforts undertaken
for sound constructive reasons, judged by participants at the time to
have been fully valid and usually aimed at correcting deficiencies of
the time. But collectively, with time and bureaucratic evolution,
they turned out to be counterproductive."  Some of the DI's SOPs
prevent analysts from applying the tradecraft standards and other
forms of expertise learned elsewhere. Jack Davis--a former DI officer
and analytic methodologist—observed that "examples of what MacEachin
would label as poorly substantiated analysis are still seen (after
training). Clearly, ongoing vigilance is needed to keep such analysis
from finding its way into DI products."  Such vigilance includes
assessing the bureaucratic context for obstacles preventing
tradecraft application.

Analysts must have the opportunity to apply newly acquired expertise
back at their desks in the DI for any improvement to result. However,
if analysts do not have the opportunity to apply this expertise, it
will likely wither for lack of practice. The DI produces many types
of finished intelligence--some reportorial, some analytical, and some
estimative—to meet policymakers' varying needs for information. In
addition to daily updates on developments worldwide, policymakers and
their staffs also use information and analyses when crafting policy
and monitoring its implementation. Obstacles to the development of
expertise appear when shorter product types are emphasized over
longer more research-oriented ones. Short turnaround products—
including daily updates known as "current" intelligence--have at
times been emphasized over other products for their greater relevancy
to policymakers, but this emphasis at the same time has reduced the
expertise of the DI writ large because they require different kinds
of mental operations that reduce the scope and scale of an analyst's
research and knowledge. Robert Jervis once observed that "the
informal norms and incentives of the intelligence community often
form what Charles Perrow has called `an error-inducing system.' That
is, interlocking and supporting habits of the community
systematically decrease the likelihood that careful and penetrating
intelligence analyses will be produced and therefore make errors
extremely likely."  Bureaucratic processes can contribute to the
creation of this kind of "error-inducing system."

The Swinging Pendulum

For much of the DI's history, analysts acquired expertise by writing
long reports. As former CIA officer Arthur Hulnick notes: "a great
deal of research was being done, but ...much of it was doneto enable
the analyst to speak authoritatively on a  current issue, rather than
for publication."  Loch Johnson agrees, saying that "[t]he
preparation of longer reports...is important, too, as … a vital
learning experience for analysts."  He adds that "[I]ntellectually
most satisfying to the intelligence analyst is the full-blown
research project, for it allows more room for the tracing of nuances.
… Under the Reagan administration, the [DI] established a research
program…[in which] each of the ten [DI] offices…was told to redouble
its efforts to produce solid research papers. In one nine-month
period, more than 900 such reports were in progress… .[A]s Gates has
claimed, 'the CIA is the only place where long-range research on
national security issues is being done—two, five, ten, twenty years
down the road. The Department of State Planning Staff conducts this
kind of research only sporadically.'"

By the early 1990s, however, long papers had become bureaucratized.
In a 1993 article, former analyst Jay Young argued that "the needs of
the policy-maker too often get lost in the time-consuming, self-
absorbed and corrosive intelligence research production process. The
DI's research program is run with the same rigid attention to
production quotas as any five-year plan in the old USSR. … This
fixation on numerical production leads managers to keep analysts
working away on papers whose relevance may be increasingly
questionable. … In short, too much of the Agency's longer-term
research is untimely, on subjects of marginal importance and chock-
full of fuzzy judgments."   He went on to advocate a reduction in the
number of long papers published each year.  In short, although longer
papers helped develop analytic expertise, bureaucratic tendencies had
made their production increasingly irrelevant to policymakers.

In response to such criticisms, DI managers dictated that relevancy
required shorter papers. In 1994, then-DDI Doug MacEachin
limited "most DI analytical papers … to 3 to 7 pages, including
graphics and illustrations."  Shorter reports made the DI's
analytical output more useful for policymakers, but analysts acquired
less expertise on each topic.  As a result, while the papers were
more targeted, they contained fewer insights for the policymaker.
Predictably, complaints then arose that the DI lacked the expertise
necessary to do quality analysis. According to former DI analyst John
Gentry in 1995:

For reasons that heavily reflect its changing internal culture, CIA
has begun to think much more myopically. It even claims now that it
is emphasizing `tactical' projects and largely eliminated `strategic'
work. In the DI, these terms are new ones for what formerly
were `current intelligence' and `research,' respectively… The change
is major and is formal policy…In other words, CIA has given up its
former mission of trying to develop the analytic expertise and the
information assets to forecast another Pearl Harbor in favor of
collecting information to serve the analytic priority of drafting the
short, pithy pieces for the National Intelligence Daily (NID) and
other current intelligence publications…This change is enormous--and
it is enormously irresponsible. …[T]he  failure to devote resources
to long-term collection and to the development and maintenance of
analytical expertise risks major surprises--and major intelligence
failures--in the future."

By 1997, DI management had admitted that the pendulum had swung too
far and they were making efforts to address the decreased level of
expertise.  In 1997, then-DDI John McLaughlin noted that the DI's
recent "impressive record of supporting the current intelligence
needs of senior policymakers" made "an enormous claim on our
personnel and resources" and the DI was "trying to balance the need
for current support against the need to look ahead."  Since then the
DI has emphasized acquisition of expertise, and funded opportunities
for analysts to gain it by arguing that "[a]nother priority for
intelligence analysis is to deliver a product that adds context and
meaning to the raw intelligence. ... One of the ways to stay relevant
is to build and maintain subject matter expertise, continuity, and
depth within the analytical ranks."

Losing Expertise to Gain Relevance

The swing of the pendulum that emphasizes policymaker relevance over
analytic depth causes the DI to produce a large amount of current
intelligence that prevents the acquisition and application of
analytic expertise. Many analysts are facile data interpreters able
to integrate large volumes of new information with existing
knowledge, and interpret—based on underlying conceptual constructs--
the significance of the new data in terms of its implications for
U.S. foreign policymaking. This process provides policymakers with
exactly what they are looking for from intelligence analysis.
However, if provided with minimal time in which to integrate and
process the information, the intelligence analyst by necessity cuts
corners. When the DI emphasizes intelligence "on-demand," analysts
meet the much shorter deadlines by reducing the scope and scale of
their research as well as sidestepping the more laborious tradecraft
procedures by not rigorously scrutinizing assumptions or comparing
working hypotheses to competing explanations. Many times current
intelligence analysis consists of a single hypothesis--derived within
the first hour of the tasking--that the analyst intuitively believes
provides the best explanation for the data. Current intelligence as a
product has a lesser chance of being accurate because it lacks the
self-conscious rigor that tradecraft entails even though it is the
best that can be done under the press of quick deadlines.

The production of a single piece of current intelligence has limited
effect on expertise because it draws on the knowledge and tools that
an analyst has developed through training and prior analysis.
However, if over time the analyst does not have the time to think,
learn, or integrate new information with old to create new
understandings, knowledge of facts and events may increase but the
ability to interpret these events accurately decreases.

In a production environment attuned to the policymaker's current need
for information, analysts will fail to apply the newly acquired
expertise and instead will fall back to providing intuitive rather
than structured analysis. Intelligence scholar Robert Folker observed
that in his interviews of intelligence analysts a "repeated complaint
was the analyst's lack of time to devote to thoughtful intelligence
analysis. In a separate interview at CIA it was revealed that
[intelligence analysts]… spend little time or effort conducting
analysis."  Therefore, the effectiveness of expertise development
programs in improving analytic accuracy may depend in part on whether
the CIA is able to redress the over-emphasis on short-term analysis.
Balancing the swinging pendulum is easier to recommend than to do
since production of both extremes—long-term research and current
intelligence support--may be necessary.



A Structural Fix?

If the DI remains true to form, at some time in the future  the
pendulum will swing too far toward knowledge-creation, papers will
become longer and   less relevant to policymakers.  Perhaps there is
a way to diagnose more accurately the cause of this swing and find a
middle-ground that balances the trade-offs. The answer, however, does
not lie in directives from the top that emphasize the utility or
desirableness of one product type over another. These will likely
just be encapsulated into the DI's SOPs and move the pendulum too far
in the opposite direction. Instead, if CIA were to bifurcate its
intelligence production system to specialize both in long-term
research and current intelligence support, it would side-step the
trade-offs between timeliness and accuracy that ultimately cause the
pendulum to swing, and make the best use of any expertise development
program. Underlying this suggestion is a more strategic and nuanced
approach to human resources management than CIA currently uses.

Just as there are different kinds of intelligence products requiring
different levels of analytic ability, individual analysts possess
varying cognitive strengths and weaknesses. As a senior DI analyst
noted in an internal computer discussion in 1997, there may be two
types of cognitive preferences--not "mutually exclusive"—that
differentiate one kind of analyst from another: "Some people are
better at…a broad range of issues, areas, and disciplines. These make
the best current intelligence analysts because they generally are
quick to learn an account. … In simple terms, these are the people
who are good at crafting a coherent story from a jumble of seemingly
disconnected parts. … Becoming an expert at this kind of analysis
requires a great deal of experience. … An expert of this type needs
to continuously cast a net over a greater range of evidence and then
relate it." He then goes on to add that it is better if this kind of
analyst has experience on multiple accounts. Then he contrasts this
expert generalist to "the other type of expert analyst…who
concentrates on learning as much as possible about their chosen
subject, area, or discipline. These are our specialists. They do the
basic research, build our corporate knowledge base, and concentrate
on depth rather than breadth. In the old days in the DDI, managers
used to call these analysts the investors. They put money in the bank
account which the current intelligence analysts draw out to spend. …
University study, technical training, language proficiency, and
several years on an account are a necessity for developing the type
of analytical expertise we need for our specialists."

The DI appears to be remarkably blind to differentiation in both
analysis and analysts, perhaps because it assigns tasks to "analysts"
and equates the output with "analysis." As a result, "[w]e do not and
never have used the term 'analysis' rigorously in the [IC]" according
to Robert Bovey, formerly a special assistant to a DCI.  Robert
Jervis illustrated the problems of equating the two in 1988 by
arguing that "most political analysis would better be  described as
political reporting" and that instead of following an analytical
approach "the analyst is expected to summarize the recent reports
from the field—`cable-gisting.' … [T]he reporting style is not
analytical—there are few attempts to dig much beneath the surface of
events, to look beyond the next few weeks, to consider alternative
explanations for the events, or to carefully marshal evidence that
could support alternative views."  Jervis correctly differentiated
the analytical intelligence product from its non-analytic cousin, but
failed to distinguish between the analysts best suited for each. The
DI--instead of differentiating between analysts--uses a one-size-fits-
all recruitment, placement, training, and promotion strategy, and for
the most part views analysts as interchangeable. As a result it has
perennially had difficulty creating an appropriate mix of analytic
abilities and skills for intelligence production when an issue or
crisis develops. In particular, over time the shift in expertise
corresponding to a preference for longer papers or shorter more
current pieces is especially noticeable.

An intelligence production system bifurcated by product type would
likely eliminate many of the problems inherent in the current system.
In the early 1950s CIA intelligence production was organized by
product type. The Office of Research and Reports produced basic
intelligence, the Office of National Estimates provided forward-
looking estimates, and the Office of Current Intelligence "produce[d]
the President's daily intelligence publication,"   according to the
Agency's website. Resurrecting an Office of Current Intelligence to
handle immediate requests and an Office of Research and Reports to do
longer-term analytic papers could provide a self-selection mechanism
useful for targeting an individual's cognitive strengths at the
policymakers' intelligence needs. This structure would not promote
the loss of expertise because different kinds of expertise would be
applied to appropriate product types. However, this organizational
structure would also require trade-offs—examined below--that would
reduce regional expertise on the margins at the same time it allowed
the experts to increase theirs.


SECOND INTERVENING FACTOR: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE


The DI's organizational structure also influences which kind of
analyst expertise is acquired and applied in finished intelligence
products.  Political scientist Thomas Hammond argues that
organizational structure impacts analytic output.  He employs
information flow models to demonstrate that—given the same
information—one group of intelligence analysts organized by
discipline would produce different analytic output than another group
organized by region. He also concludes that it is impossible to
design a structure that does not impact output.  If we accept his
argument, then organizational structure always affects internal
information flows, and likely outputs as well. Theoretically,
therefore, an organizational structure divided along disciplinary
lines will accentuate learning of political, economic, military, or
leadership methodologies through constant, interactive contact and
awareness of the projects of other analysts.

However, regional or country knowledge is sacrificed due to the lack
of such contact.  In an office structured along geographic lines, the
emphasis will be reversed. The 1998 India intelligence failure
provides a good illustration of how organization can affect
expertise.  Prior to the 1996 creation of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, imagery analysts had been distributed, by affiliation
at least, throughout the Intelligence Community.  According to former
CIA analyst Melvin Goodman, "the consolidation of all analysis of
satellite imagery in (NIMA)...contributed to the intelligence
failure.  By placing all analysis of imagery inside the Department of
Defense...there would be a minimum of the critical cross-discipline
analysis required for difficult regional problems such as the
political and military frictions in South Asia."  This episode may be
consideredan illustration of how trade-offs in expertise inherent in
organizational structure can affect the DI as well.

Over the past 50 years the DI has been structured by product type, by
discipline, and by region. From approximately the early 1960s to
1981, the DI was structured primarily by discipline with political,
economic, military, and leadership offices each subdivided by
geography. In 1981 "(a) (DI)-wide reorganization…shuffled most
analysts and created geographically based, or "regional" offices out
of the previous organization."  According to former CIA officer
Arthur Hulnick: "These [new] offices combined political, economic,
military, and other kinds of research under "one roof," thus making
more detailed analytic research feasible. After some grumbling, the
new offices began to turn out the in-depth products consumers had
been seeking, while still providing current intelligence materials."
This integration of analytic disciplines in regional offices provided
a more productive interpretation of the forces at work within a
target country or region but also negatively affected the DI's
ability to maintain disciplinary knowledge.

The 1995 dismantling of the DI's Office of Leadership Analysis (LDA)
provides a good case study into the trade-offs between disciplinary
and regional expertise resulting from differing organizational
arrangements.   Since at least 1963 the CIA has consolidated
biographic information on foreign leaders, and over time the value of
leadership analysis as a complement to political, economic, and
military analysis became evident.  Analysis grounded in the theory of
political psychology provided insight into a leader's behavior above
and beyond the limited biographic scope of a leadership profile.  LDA
was thus created to develop and consolidate the discipline of
leadership analysis and put it on a near-equal basis with the other
established analytic disciplines. However, in 1994, then-DDI Doug
MacEachin reorganized LDA--the only disciplinary office left--out of
existence as part of "downsizing the DI."  Political factors may have
played a part in this decision. The Clinton Administration's Haiti
policy was greatly complicated by partisan opposition in the wake of
a leaked leadership profile produced by LDA questioning the
psychological stability of Jean Bertrand Aristide.  In any case,
LDA's elimination had an impact on the expertise of the DI's
leadership analysts.

The regional offices swallowed LDA as its component units were
assigned to the relevant regional office. Some regional offices kept
leadership analysts together as a team so as to maintain the
disciplinary knowledge developed in LDA. Other offices broke
leadership teams apart and assigned individual analysts to join multi-
disciplinary country teams. The distribution of what had previously
been centralized knowledge of analytic tools, specialized product
formats, and disciplinary theory throughout the DI meant that new
leadership analysts were not well trained in their discipline. These
new analysts relied solely on the fast-dissipating knowledge of the
handful of former LDA officers who happened to be assigned to their
team or issue. In addition, actual physical co-location did not occur
for months--and in some cases years--due to lack of space in CIA's
overcrowded headquarters building. As a result of being "out of
sight, out of mind," leadership analysts were frequently not informed
of ongoing projects, briefings, and meetings, and such incidents had
a negative impact on the finished analytical product. When leadership
analysts were not included in briefings, the DI risked failing to
keep its consumers fully informed of both leadership dynamics and
changes within the country or region.  In addition, products
published and disseminated without coordination at times contained
factual errors such as the wrong names or positions for foreign
government officials, or distortions in analysis due to the lack of
leadership analyst input.  However, once re-organization occurred,
regional counterpart analysts became team members, and after a
shaking-out period began to incorporate leadership analyst's
contribution into their products more easily.  In fact, the close
interaction with other members of the regional team led to a better
incorporation of leadership analysis into regional products than had
occurred during the heydays of LDA.   Therefore, the elimination of a
leadership analysis-based office resulted in both increased
incorporation of leadership analysis and insight into the regional
teams' products, and decreased corporate knowledge and expertise in
leadership analysis as a discipline. The same occurred for the other
disciplines when their respective offices were eliminated in 1981.


PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER AGAIN


By the mid-1990s DI analysts were realizing that while multi-
disciplinary analysis on country teams made for better integration of
disciplines, it also led to the dissipation of disciplinary
knowledge. Former LDA analysts' efforts to sustain their hold on
disciplinary knowledge triggered similar efforts by political,
economic and military analysts to both sustain and reconstruct
occupational-specific knowledge. Without the framework of structural
organization to bind each discipline together, over time they had
each grown apart.

To rectify this loss of disciplinary expertise, in 1997 the DI
created the "senior-level" Council of Intelligence Occupations (CIOC)
with the initial intent of disciplinary "workforce strategic planning…
in the areas of recruitment, assignments, and training" as well
as "identify[ing] core skills and standards for expertise in the
[DI]."  In practice, CIOC became a home for senior analysts
interested in learning and teaching their discipline's methodologies.
They "establish[ed] a professional development program for all DI
employees that provides explicit proficiency criteria at each level
so that everyone can see the knowledge, skills, and experiences
required for advancement within each occupation or across
occupations."  All this was done—according to the CIA website--"so
that the DI has the expertise needed to provide value-added all-
source analysis to its customers."  CIOC emphasized disciplinary
training as a method to achieve this goal.  As the CIA's website
notes, "(t)he Council views learning and skills development as an
essential part of work and the means whereby employees can respond to
changes in customer priorities and the external environment."  In
2000, CIOC was disbanded although its training functions have been
incorporated into the DI's Kent School and its other knowledge has
been distributed elsewhere within the DI.

There may be no easy solution to the expertise trade-offs inherent in
organizational structure. By definition, the structure will create
synergies in the areas emphasized but the opportunity cost of doing
so means losing the synergies in other areas. At bottom this is a
prioritization issue: the organizational structure should reflect the
dynamic that the DI leadership believes will most directly benefit
its policymaker consumers. Establishing secondary institutions like
CIOC or disciplinary training through the Kent School to bolster the
lost expertise may be the only way to preserve knowledge that
otherwise would be lost.


TO THE FUTURE


Expertise-development programs that create the potential to improve
overall analytic accuracy--such as formal training in methodologies,
regions, disciplines, or languages, or informal training resulting
from greater overseas experience--do not provide much in the way of
improvement if in fact the DI's business practices prevent
application of this hard-earned expertise. CIA's leaders should
continue to pursue ways to increase analyst expertise, for they could
contribute to increased analytic accuracy.  Yet at the same time the
DI must adapt its practices to leverage the potential improvements of
these programs if the CIA is to provide its policymaking customers
with the intelligence they need now and in the future. The creation
of a bifurcated production process might remove an impediment
preventing acquisition and application of expertise, but other
reforms may be necessary as well.

The CIA was created in the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor to coordinate and integrate intelligence information and
provide strategic warning should any foe of the United States choose
to attack.  With respect to the September 2001 attacks on the U.S.-it
is still too soon to determine whether the CIA's failure to provide
specific warning lay in organizational inefficiencies, collection
gaps, analytic missteps, or in some combination of the three.
Regardless, improvements in intelligence analysis must occur so as to
provide policymakers with warning of any potential future attacks
while preventing surprises on issues of national security importance.
Managing the DI so that it can produce accurate intelligence will
require an accurate assessment of the DI's current capabilities, an
understanding of its limitations, and creative approaches to overcome
them. Current DI business practices entail tradeoffs that prevent
full actualization of the DI's potential.  Perhaps through serious
study the constraints that the DI's working environment imposes on
analytic expertise will be understood and overcome.  As Robert Jervis
declares, "(w)e will never be able to do as well as we would like,
but this does not mean that we cannot do better than we are doing
now."





BIBLIOGRAPHY

Asker, James R. "Same Ol', Same Ol'," Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 8 June
1998: 21.

Betts, Richard K. "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence
Failures Are
     	 Inevitable, World Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978): 61-89.

Betts, Richard K. "Policy-Makers and Intelligence Analysts: Love,
Hate or
Indifference?'" Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 1 (January
1988): 184-
189.

Bovey, Robert. "The Quality of Intelligence Analysis." American
Intelligence Journal 3
no. 4 (Winter 1980-81): 6-11.

Center for Security Policy.  "'Say It Ain't So, Jim': Impending
Reorganization of CIA
Looks Like Suppression, Politicizing of Intelligence."  Publication
No. 94-D74, 15 July 1994.  Available at URL: http://www.security-
policy.org/papers/1994/94-D74.html.  Accessed October 2001.

CIA officer. "Two Types of Expert Analyst,"  DI Discussion Database,
28 March 1997.

CIA website, "Directorate of Intelligence Organizational Components,
Council of
Intelligence Occupations," URL:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/mission/cioc.html. Accessed October 2001.

CIA website.  "Intelligence Disciplines," URL:
  http://www.odci.gov/cia/di/work/disciplines.html. Accessed October
2001.

CIA website, "Jeremiah News Conference," URL:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/archives/1998/jere
miah.html. Accessed October 2001.

CIA website.  "Key Events In DI History." URL:
  http://www.odci.gov/cia/di/history/index.html.  Accessed October
2001.

CIA website, " National Imagery and Mapping Agency," URL:
   http://www.cia.gov/ic/nima.html.  Accessed October 2001.

CIA website.  "Remarks of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
John E.
McLaughlin at the Conference on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union,
1947-1991, Princeton University 9 March 2001." URL:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/ddci_speech_03092001.ht
ml.
      	 Accessed October 2001.

CIA website: "Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence George
J. Tenet at the
      	 of the Sherman Kent School, 4 May 2000," URL:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/2000/dci_speec
h_05052000.html.  Accessed October 2001.

CIA website, " The Role and Mission of the Directorate of
Intelligence," URL:
      	 http://www.odci.gov/cia/di/mission/mission.html .  Accessed
October 2001.

Colby, William. "Retooling the Intelligence Industry." Foreign
Service Journal 69, no. 1
 	 (January 1992): 21-25.

Davis, Jack. "Improving Intelligence Analysis at CIA: Dick Heuer's
Contribution to
Intelligence Analysis," in "Introduction" to Psychology of
Intelligence Analysis,  Richards J. Heuer, Jr.  (Washington, DC:
Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), xix.

Folker, Robert D. Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence
Centers: An
Experiment in Applying Structured Methods,  Occasional Paper Number
Seven (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, January
2000).


Garst, Ronald D and Max L. Gross, "On Becoming an Intelligence
Analyst." Defense
Intelligence Journal 6, no. 2 (1997): 47-59.

Gentry, John A.  "A Framework for Reform of the U.S. Intelligence
Community."
Remarks prepared for presentation to congressional intelligence
committees, 6 June 1995.  Available on the Federation of American
Scientists webpage at URL:  http://www.fas.org/irp/gentry/.
Accessed October 2001.

Goodman, Melvin A. "US Intelligence Failure Shows Need for Reform,"
Christian
Science Monitor, 18 May 1998, 11. URL:
http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1998/05/18/p11s1.htm.  Accessed
October 2001.

Hammond, Thomas H. "Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and
Bureaucratic
     	 Politics" American Journal of Political Science 30, no. 2
(May 1986): 379-420.

Heuer, Richards J. Jr.  "Improving Intelligence Analysis: Some
Insights on Data,
Concepts and Management in the Intelligence Community," The
Bureaucrat 8, no. 1 (Winter 1979/80):2-11.

Hitz, Frederick P. "The Future of American Espionage," International
Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13, no. 1 (2000): 1-20.

Hulnick, Arthur S. "Managing Intelligence Analysis: Strategies for
Playing the End

    	  Game." International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 2, no. 3
    	  (1988): 321-343.

Jervis, Robert. "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Process?"
International Journal of
    	  Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1 (1986): 28-41.

Johnson, Loch K. "Analysis For a New Age." Intelligence and National
Security 11,  no.
4  (October 1996):  657-671.

Johnson, Loch K. "Making the Intelligence 'Cycle' Work,"
International Journal of
    	 Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 4 (1986): 1-23.

Loeb, Vernon. "CIA's Analysis Becomes Transnational." Washington Post
Online, 2
April 2001. URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?
pagename=article&node=&contentId=A16925-2001Mar30

MacEachin, Douglas J. and others. The Tradecraft of Analysis:
Challenge and Change in
  the CIA.  Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence,
1994.

McLaughlin, John E. "New Challenges and Priorities for Analysis."
Defense Intelligence
     	 Journal 6, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 11-21.

Marrin, Stephen."Complexity is in the Eye of the Beholder,"  DI
Discussion Database, 6
  May 1997.

Omestad, Thomas. "Psychology and the CIA: Leaders on the Couch."
Foreign Policy 95
    	  (Summer 1994): 105-122.

Robbins, Carla Anne.  "Failure to Predict India's Tests Is Tied to
Systemwide
  Intelligence Breakdown,"  Wall Street Journal, 3 June 1998, A8.


Turner, Stansfield. "Intelligence for A New World Order." Foreign
Affairs 70, no. 4 (Fall
  1991): 150-166.

Watanabe, Frank. "Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts." Studies
in Intelligence.
    	 Unclassified edition, 1997.  Available at URL:
     	 http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/97unclass/axioms.html.
Accessed October 2001.

Weiner, Tim.  "Naivete at the CIA: Every Nation's Just Another U.S.,"
New York Times:
Week in Review, 7 June 1998, 5.

Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Blundered on Intelligence, Officials Admit." New
York Times,
     	  13 May 1998, A1, A14.

White, Ralph K.  "Empathy As an Intelligence Tool."  International
Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 57-75.

Young, Jay T. "US Intelligence Assessment in a Changing World: The
Need for
Reform." Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 2 (April 1993):
125-139.






ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stephen Marrin is a graduate student specializing in intelligence
studies at the University of Virginia, and he developed the ideas for
this paper as part of his Master's thesis assessing the impact of the
CIA's Kent School on analytic quality. He has also participated in
CIA's analytic process in three different capacities: in 1996 and
1997 as a leadership analyst for CIA's Office of Near East, South
Asia, and Africa; in 1998 as a project assistant for a group in the
Office of Transnational Issues; and in 1999 and 2000 as a team leader
for a contractor supplying analytical support to the Office of
Transnational Issues. As required, this paper has been reviewed by
CIA's Publication Review Board—which has no security objection to its
dissemination--although their review does not confirm the accuracy of
the information nor does it endorse the author's views.

WMD & the Intelligence Function

January 12-14, 2004 (Tampa, FL)
Instructor: Harvey J. McGeorge, PhD, h.c.
Tuition Individual: $595.00
Restrictions: LEO/USG**

Presentation Time:
24-Hrs/3 Days (9:00am to 5:00pm)



In today's threat environment, law enforcement, military
intelligence professionals and hazmat units are increasingly called
on to gather and assess information about chemical and biological
terrorism or suspected weapons programs. In this three-day seminar,
UN Weapons Inspector Harvey J. McGeorge demystifies the complex
world of chemical and biological WMD and provides effective
strategies for identifying, collecting, and analyzing CBW
information.
Topics include:

Domestic and Foreign CB Adversaries * CB Agents * Dissemination and
Weaponization of CB Agents * Employment Concepts * Objective Target
Selection * Customer Information Requirements * Open Source
Collection * Clandestine Collection * Data Collation * Threat
Analysis

This program is presented by Dr. Harvey "Jack" McGeorge, one of the
nation's leading experts in chemical and biological weapons,
proliferation, and terrorism. In addition to his status as a UN
Weapons Inspector, Dr. McGeorge has been consulting for the U.S.
intelligence community on CBW issues for over 15 years.

Sincere Regards;

Tim O'Rourke, CPS
S2 Institute
1261 S. Missouri Avenue
Clearwater, Florida 33756
orourke@...
www.s2institute.com
http://www.s2institute.com/advancedclasses/wmdintel.html

Hillsborough:   (813) 227-8585
Pinellas:         (727) 461-0066
all faxes:         (727) 449-1269

Longtemps, l'accès à l'Information était un privilège,
aujourd'hui, c'est l'accès à la bonne information et au bon moment
qui en est un !

www.lobservatoire.net

Merci pour votre visite !

----------

For long, access to Information was a Priviledge,
today, the Priviledge is access to the Right Information at the Right
Time!

www.lobservatoire.net

Thank you for your visit!

----------

Längere Zeit, Zugang zur Information war das Vorteil von wenige,
heute ist es den Zugang zur richtige Information zum richtigen
Zeitpunkt!

www.lobservatoire.net

Danke für Ihren Besuch!

Very good article By PAUL DE LA GARZA, Times Staff Writer about
anti-terrorism deployments for power plants.  Of course CIS is the
feature!!!  ;-)

It can be found at....

http://www.sptimes.com/2004/01/11/Tampabay/Terror_proofing_TECO.shtml



KC Poulin, CPOI, CPS, CHS-III
President & CEO
Critical Intervention Services
1-800-247-6055  727-461-9417
www.CISWorldServices.org

Please visit www.safetampabay.org for any of your public safety
information needs.

Training update, next course is February with some of the Army SFG
then the Marine SO units straight after. The training is designed at
operating in hostile environments, all the instructors/ operators
have recently returned from Iraq, we are a source for personnel for
those regions, Iraq and Afghanistan.

More training information is on the web site, with all the dates for
the rest of the year.

Cheers.

Stephen J Mastalerz
www.trojansecurities.com

ONLINE WORKSHOP SERIES 2004 IN
            CONCEPTUAL AND MENTAL DEVELOPMENT


The Institute for Human Conceptual and Mental Development (IHCMD) in
the
coming year of 2004 is presenting a series of seven (7) short, four-
weeks,
Online workshops in conceptual and mental development. The workshops
will
consider and discuss human, social and environmental issues,
conditions and
developments, problems and difficulties at the level of mental
existence
and mental development. The Workshop series begins on February 2,
2004 with
a workshop on understanding and managing mental existence and mental
development from within the mind and mental existence as reflected in
individual experience.

The workshops are presented within the larger context and objectives
of
understanding and addressing persisting and growing human, social and
environmental problems and difficulties we face and we create,
individually, as society and as a species around the world today.
Understanding and addressing them through understanding and managing
human
existence and development, demands and challenges, problems and
difficulties at the level of the fundamental nature and condition of
existence that are common to all human beings, that lie behind and
that are
reflected in human experience. Considering and understanding them, in
depth
and detail, in differentiated, connected and related ways at the
level of
mental existence and mental development, where they are experienced,
where
we become aware of them and where we must in the first instance deal
with
and respond to them.

The workshops are intended for those interested and concerned about
fundamental, in-depth and detailed, differentiated, connected and
related
understanding. Those interested and concerned about fundamental and
long-term change at the level of mental existence and mental
development to
understand and deal with the human, social and environmental
conditions,
problems and difficulties we face and we create, locally and globally,
around the world today.

For details and registration information, please go to the IHCMD
website at
http://www.ihcmd.org, click on "Events" and follow the links. To
receive
notice of future Online programs you can subscribe to the IHCMD
mailing
list. Go to the IHCMD website, click on "Mailing List" and follow the
instructions.

I would greatly appreciate your assistance bringing the information
to the
attention of anyone you know who might be interested and who may
benefit
from the Workshops.


Axel Dorscht
Organizer and Host


______________________________________________________________________
____

  Dr. Axel Dorscht                        | Institute for Human
Conceptual
  Tel: (613) 233-8354                     |  and Mental Development
(IHCMD)
  E-mail: a.dorscht@...             | 9 Second Avenue, Suite 2
  Website: http://www.ihcmd.org           | Ottawa, ON  K1S 2H2  Canada

I have come here today to talk to you-and to the American people-
about something important to our nation and central to our future:
how the United States intelligence community evaluated Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction programs over the past decade, leading to a
National Intelligence Estimate in October of 2002. I want to tell you
about our information and how we reached our judgments.


I will tell you what I think-honestly and directly.


There are several reasons to do this. Because the American people
deserve to know. Because intelligence has never been more important
to the security of our country.


As a nation, we have over the past seven years been rebuilding our
intelligence-with powerful capabilities-that many thought we would no
longer need after the end of the Cold War. We have been rebuilding
our Clandestine Service, our satellite and other technical
collection, our analytic depth and expertise. Both here and around
the world, the men and women of American intelligence are performing
courageously-often brilliantly-to support our military, to stop
terrorism, and to break up networks of proliferation.

The risks are always high. Success and perfect outcomes never
guaranteed. But there is one unassailable fact-we will always call it
as we see it. Our professional ethic demands no less.

To understand a difficult topic like Iraq takes patience and care.
Unfortunately, you rarely hear a patient, careful- or thoughtful-
discussion of intelligence these days. But these times demand it.
Because the alternative-politicized, haphazard evaluation, without
the benefit of time and facts-may well result in an intelligence
community that is damaged, and a country that is more at risk.



Before talking about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, I want to
set the stage with a few words about intelligence collection and
analysis-how they actually happen in the real world. This context is
completely missing from the current public debate. By definition,
intelligence deals with the unclear, the unknown, the deliberately
hidden. What the enemies of the United States hope to deny, we work
to reveal.


The question being asked about Iraq in the starkest of terms is: were
we "right" or were we "wrong." In the intelligence business, you are
almost never completely wrong or completely right. That applies in
full to the question of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. And,
like many of the toughest intelligence challenges, when the facts on
Iraq are all in, we will be neither completely right nor completely
wrong. As intelligence professionals, we go where the information
takes us. We fear no fact or finding, whether it bears us out or not.
Because we work for high goals-the protection of the American people-
we must be judged by high standards.


Let's turn to Iraq.



Much of the current controversy centers on our prewar intelligence on
Iraq, summarized in the National Intelligence Estimate of October
2002.

National estimates are publications where the intelligence community
as a whole seeks to sum up what we know about a subject, what we do
not know, what we suspect may be happening, and where we differ on
key issues. This estimate asked if Iraq had chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. We concluded that in
some of these categories, Iraq had weapons. And that in others-where
it did not have them-it was trying to develop them. Let me be clear:
analysts differed on several important aspects of these programs and
those debates were spelled out in the estimate. They never said there
was an "imminent" threat. Rather, they painted an objective
assessment for our policymakers of a brutal dictator who was
continuing his efforts to deceive and build programs that might
constantly surprise us and threaten our interests. No one told us
what to say or how to say it.


How did we reach our conclusions? We had three streams of information-
none perfect, but each important.


First: Iraq's history. Everyone knew that Iraq had chemical and
biological weapons in the 1980s and 1990s. Saddam Hussein used
chemical weapons against Iran and his own people on at least 10
different occasions. He launched missiles against Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and Israel. And we couldn't forget that in the early 1990s, we saw
that Iraq was just a few years way from a nuclear weapon-this was no
theoretical program. It turned out that we and the other intelligence
services of the world had significantly underestimated his progress.
And, finally, we could not forget that Iraq lied repeatedly about its
unconventional weapons.

So, to conclude before the war that Saddam had no interest in
rebuilding his WMD programs, we would have had to ignore his long and
brutal history of using them. Our second stream of information was
that the United Nations could not-and Saddam would not-account for
all the weapons the Iraqis had: tons of chemical weapons precursors,
hundreds of artillery shells and bombs filled with chemical or
biological agents. We did not take this data at face value. We did
take it seriously. We worked with the inspectors, giving them leads,
helping them fight Saddam's deception strategy of "cheat and
retreat." Over eight years of inspections, Saddam's deceptions-and
the increasingly restrictive rules of engagement UN inspectors were
forced to negotiate with the regime-undermined efforts to disarm him.

To conclude before the war that Saddam had destroyed his existing
weapons, we would have had to ignore what the United Nations and
allied intelligence said they could not verify.


The third stream of information came after the UN inspectors left
Iraq in 1998. We gathered intelligence through human agents,
satellite photos, and communications intercepts. Other foreign
intelligence services were clearly focused on Iraq and assisted in
the effort. In intercepts of conversations and other transactions, we
heard Iraqis seeking to hide prohibited items, worrying about their
cover stories, and trying to procure items Iraq was not permitted to
have.

Satellite photos showed a pattern of activity designed to conceal
movement of material from places where chemical weapons had been
stored in the past. We also saw reconstruction of dual purpose
facilities previously used to make biological agents or chemical
precursors. And human sources told us of efforts to acquire and hide
materials used in the production of such weapons. And to come to
conclusions before the war other than those we reached, we would have
had to ignore all the intelligence gathered from multiple sources
after 1998.

Did these strands of information weave into a perfect picture-could
they answer every question? No-far from it. But, taken together, this
information provided a solid basis on which to estimate whether Iraq
did or did not have weapons of mass destruction and the means to
deliver them. It is important to underline the word estimate. Because
not everything we analyze can be known to a standard of absolute
proof.


Now, what exactly was in the October Estimate? Why did we say it? And
what does the postwar evidence thus far show? Before we start, let me
be direct about an important fact-as we meet here today-the Iraq
Survey Group is continuing its important search for weapons, people,
and data. And despite some public statements, we are nowhere near 85%
finished. The men and women who work in that dangerous environment
are adamant about that fact. Any call I make today is necessarily
provisional. Why? Because we need more time and we need more data.


So, what did our estimate say?


Let's start with missile and other delivery systems for WMD. Our
community said with high confidence that Saddam was continuing and
expanding his missile programs contrary to UN resolutions. He had
missiles and other systems with ranges in excess of UN restrictions
and was seeking missiles with even longer ranges. What do we know
today? Since the war, we have found an aggressive Iraqi missile
program concealed from the international community.


In fact David Kay said just last fall that the Iraq Survey
Group "discovered sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the
Iraqi regime was committed to delivery system improvements that would
have, if [Operation Iraqi Freedom] had not occurred, dramatically
breached UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf war." We
have also found that Iraq had plans and advanced design work for
liquid propellant missiles with ranges up to 1000 km - activity that
Iraq did not report to the UN and which could have placed large
portions of the Middle East in jeopardy. We have confirmed that Iraq
had new work underway on prohibited solid propellant missiles that
were also concealed from the UN.

Significantly, the Iraq Survey Group has also confirmed prewar
intelligence that Iraq was in secret negotiations with North Korea to
obtain some of its most dangerous missile technology. My provisional
bottom line today: On missiles, we were generally on target. Let me
turn to unmanned aerial vehicles. The estimate said that Iraq had
been developing an unmanned aerial vehicle, probably intended to
deliver biological warfare agents. Baghdad's existing unmanned aerial
vehicles could threaten its neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf,
and-if a small unmanned aerial vehicle was brought close to our
shores -- the United States itself.




What do we know today? The Iraq Survey Group found that two separate
groups in Iraq were working on a number of unmanned aerial vehicle
designs that were hidden from the UN until Iraq's declaration of
December 2002. Now we know that important design elements were never
fully declared. The question of intent-especially regarding the
smaller unmanned aerial vehicles-is still out there. But we should
remember that the Iraqis flight-tested an aerial Biological Weapon
spray system intended for a large unmanned aerial vehicle. A senior
Iraqi official has now admitted that their two large unmanned aerial
vehicles-one developed in the early 90s and the other under
development in late 2000-were intended for delivery of biological
weapons.


My provisional bottom line today: We detected the development of
prohibited and undeclared unmanned aerial vehicles. But the jury is
still out on whether Iraq intended to use its newer, smaller unmanned
aerial vehicles to deliver biological weapons. Let me turn to the
nuclear issue. In the estimate, all agencies agreed that Saddam
wanted nuclear weapons. Most were convinced that he still had a
program and if he obtained fissile material he could have a weapon
within a year. But we detected no such acquisition.

We made two judgments that get overlooked these days-We said Saddam
did not have a nuclear weapon and, probably would have been unable to
make one until 2007 to 2009. Most agencies believed that Saddam had
begun to reconstitute his nuclear program, but they disagreed on a
number of issues such as which procurement activities were designed
to support his nuclear program. But let me be clear, where there were
differences, the estimate laid out the disputes clearly.

So what do we know today? David Kay told us last fall that ".the
testimony we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior
government officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam
still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons." Keep in mind that no
intelligence agency thought that Iraq's efforts had progressed to the
point of building an enrichment facility or making fissile material.
We said that such activities were a few years away. Therefore it is
not surprising that the Iraq Survey Group has not yet found evidence
of uranium enrichment activities.

Regarding prohibited aluminum tubes - a debate laid out extensively
in the estimate and one that experts still argue over -- were they
for uranium enrichment or conventional weapons? We have additional
data to collect and more sources to question. Moreover, none of the
tubes found in Iraq so far match the high specification tubes Baghdad
sought and may have never received in the amounts needed. Our
aggressive interdiction efforts may have prevented Iraq from
receiving all but a few of these prohibited items.


My provisional bottom line today: Saddam did not have a nuclear
weapon. He still wanted one and Iraq intended to reconstitute a
nuclear program at some point. But we have not yet found clear
evidence that the dual-use items Iraq sought were for nuclear
reconstitution. We do not know if any reconstitution efforts had
begun but we may have overestimated the progress Saddam was making.

Let me turn to biological weapons.

The Estimate said that Baghdad had them, and that all key aspects of
an offensive program-research and development, production, and
weaponization-were still active, and most elements were larger, and
more advanced than before the first Gulf war. We believed that Iraq
had lethal Biological Weapon agents, including anthrax, which it
could quickly produce and weaponize for delivery by bombs, missiles,
aerial sprayers, and covert operatives. But we said we had no
specific information on the types or quantities of weapons, agent, or
stockpiles at Baghdad's disposal.


What do we know today? Last fall, the Iraq Survey Group uncovered
( "significant information-including research and development of
biological weapons -applicable organisms, the involvement of the
Iraqi Intelligence Service in possible biological weapons activities,
and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq
after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on
maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated
quickly to surge the production of Biological Weapon agents." The
Iraq Survey Group found a network of laboratories and safehouses
controlled by Iraqi intelligence and security services that contained
equipment for chemical and biological research and a prison
laboratory complex possibly used in human testing for Biological
Weapon agents, that were not declared to the UN.


It also appears that Iraq had the infrastructure and talent to resume
production-but we have yet to find that it actually did so, nor have
we found weapons. Until we get to the bottom of the role played by
the Iraqi security services-which were operating covert labs-we will
not know the full extent of the program. Let me also talk about the
trailers discovered in Iraq last summer. We initially concluded that
they resembled trailers described by a human source for mobile
biological warfare agent production today. There is no consensus
within our community over whether the trailers were for that use or
if they were used for the production of hydrogen. Everyone agrees
they are not ideally configured for either process, but could be made
to work in either mode.

To give you some idea of the contrasting evidence we wrestle with,
some of the Iraqis involved in making the trailers were told they
were intended to produce hydrogen for artillery units. But an Iraqi
artillery officer says they never used these types of systems and
that the hydrogen for artillery units came in canisters from a fixed
production facility. We are trying to get to the bottom of this
story. And I must tell you that we are finding discrepancies in some
claims made by human sources about mobile biological weapons
production before the war. Because we lack direct access to the most
important sources on this question, we have as yet been unable to
resolve the differences.


My provisional bottom line today: Iraq intended to develop Biological
Weapons. Clearly, research and development work was underway that
would have permitted a rapid shift to agent production if seed stocks
were available. But we do not know if production took place - and
just as clearly-we have not yet found biological weapons. Before I
leave the biological weapons story, an important fact you must
remember. For years the UN searched unsuccessfully for Saddam's
biological weapons program. His son-in-law, Husayn Kamil, who
controlled the hidden program defected, and only then was the world
able to confirm that Iraq indeed had an active and dangerous
biological weapons program. Indeed, history matters in dealing with
these complicated problems. While many of us want instant answers,
this search for biological weapons in Iraq will take time and
patience.


Let me now turn to chemical weapons. We said in the estimate with
high confidence that Iraq had them. We also believed, though with
less certainty, that Saddam had stocked at least 100 metric tons of
agent. That may sound like a lot, but it would fit in a few dorm
rooms on this campus.

Initially, the community was skeptical about whether Iraq had
restarted chemical weapons agent production. Sources had reported
that Iraq had begun renewed production, and imagery and intercepts
gave us additional concerns. But only when analysts saw what they
believed to be satellite photos of shipments of materials from
ammunition sites did they believe that Iraq was again producing
Chemical Weapon agents. What do we know now? The work done so far
shows a story similar to that of his biological weapons program.
Saddam had rebuilt a dual-use industry. David Kay reported that
Saddam and his son Uday wanted to know how long it would take for
Iraq to produce chemical weapons.

However, while sources indicate Iraq may have conducted some
experiments related to developing chemical weapons, no physical
evidence has yet been uncovered. We need more time. My provisional
bottom line today: Saddam had the intent and the capability to
quickly convert civilian industry to chemical weapons production.

However, we have not yet found the weapons we expected.

I've now given you my provisional bottom lines. But it is important
to remember that Estimates are not written in a vacuum. Let me tell
you some of what was going on in the fall of 2002. Several sensitive
reports crossed my desk from two sources characterized by our foreign
partners as "established and reliable."


The first, from a source who had direct access to Saddam and his
inner circle said: Iraq was not in possession of a nuclear weapon.
However, Iraq was aggressively and covertly developing such a weapon.
Saddam had recently called together his Nuclear Weapons Committee
irate that Iraq did not yet have a weapon because money was no object
and they possessed the scientific know how. The Committee members
assured Saddam that once the fissile material was in hand, a bomb
could be ready in just 18-24 months. The return of UN inspectors
would cause minimal disruption because, according to the source, Iraq
was expert at denial and deception.


The same source said Iraq was stockpiling chemical weapons and that
equipment to produce insecticides, under the oil-for-food program,
had been diverted to covert chemical weapons production.


The source said that Iraq's weapons of "last resort" were "mobile
launchers armed with chemical weapons which would be fired at enemy
forces and Israel." Iraqi scientists were "dabbling" with biological
weapons, with limited success, But the quantities were not sufficient
to constitute a real weapons program. A stream of reporting from a
different sensitive source with access to senior Iraqi officials said
he believed: production of chemical and biological weapons was taking
place, that biological agents were easy to produce and to hide, and
prohibited chemicals were also being produced at dual-use facilities.
This source stated that a senior Iraqi official in Saddam's inner
circle believed, as a result of the UN inspections, Iraq knew the
inspectors' weak points and how to take advantage of them. The source
said there was an elaborate plan to deceive inspectors and ensure
prohibited items would never be found.


Now, did this information make a difference in my thinking? You bet
it did. As this and other information came across my desk, it
solidified and reinforced the judgments we had reached and my own
view of the danger posed by Saddam Hussein and I conveyed this view
to our nation's leaders.


Could I have ignored or dismissed such reports at the time?
Absolutely not. Continuing the Search


Now, I am sure you are asking: Why haven't we found the weapons? I
have told you the search must continue and it will be difficult.


As David Kay reminded us, the Iraqis systematically destroyed and
looted forensic evidence before, during and after the war. We have
been faced with the organized destruction of documentary and computer
evidence in a wide range of offices, laboratories, and companies
suspected of WMD work. The pattern of these efforts is one of
deliberate rather than random acts. Iraqis who have volunteered
information to us are still being intimidated and attacked.


Remember finding things in Iraq is very tough. After the first Gulf
War, the U.S. Army blew up chemical weapons without knowing it. They
were mixed in with conventional weapons in Iraqi ammo dumps. My new
Special Advisor, Charles Duelfer, will soon be in Iraq to join Major
General Keith Dayton - commander of the Iraq Survey Group - to
continue our effort to learn the truth. And, when the truth emerges,
we will report it to the American public - no matter what. REVIEWING
OUR WORK


As Director of Central Intelligence, I have an important
responsibility. I have a responsibility to evaluate our performance --
  both our operational work and our analytical tradecraft. So what do
I think about all of this?


Based on an assessment of the data we collected over the past 10
years, it would have been difficult for analysts to come to any
different conclusions than the ones reached in October of 2002.


However, in our business that is not good enough. We must constantly
review the quality of our work. For example, the National
Intelligence Council is reviewing the estimate line-by-line. Six
months ago we also commissioned an internal review to examine the
tradecraft of our work on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. And,
through this effort we are finding ways to improve our processes.

For example, we recently discovered that relevant analysts in the
community missed a notice that identified a source we had cited as
providing information that, in some cases was unreliable, and in
other cases was fabricated. We have acknowledged this mistake.

In addition to these internal reviews, I asked Dick Kerr, a former
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and a team of retired senior
analysts to evaluate the estimate.

Among the questions that we as a Community must ultimately reflect on
are: Did the history of our work, Saddam's deception and denial, his
lack of compliance with the international community, and all that we
know about this regime cause us to minimize, or ignore, alternative
scenarios? Did the fact that we missed how close Saddam came to
acquiring a nuclear weapon in the early 1990s cause us to over-
estimate his nuclear or other programs in 2002? Did we carefully
consider the absence of information flowing from a repressive and
intimidating regime, and would it have made any difference in our
bottom line judgments? Did we clearly tell policy makers what we
knew, what we didn't know, what was not clear, and identify the gaps
in our knowledge?

We are in the process of evaluating just such questions - and while
others will express views on the questions sooner, we ourselves must
come to our own bottom lines. I will say that our judgments were not
single threaded. UN inspections served as a baseline and we had
multiple strands of reporting from signals, imagery, and human
intelligence. After the UN inspectors left Iraq in 1998, we made an
aggressive effort to penetrate Iraq. Our record was mixed.


While we had voluminous reporting, the major judgments reached were
based on a narrower band of data. This is not unusual. There was, by
necessity, a strong reliance on technical data, which to be sure was
very valuable, particularly in the imagery of military and key dual
use facilities, on missile and unmanned aerial vehicle developments--
and in particular on the efforts of Iraqi front companies to falsify
and deny us the ultimate destination and use of dual use equipment.
We did not have enough of our own human intelligence. We did not
ourselves penetrate the inner sanctum - our agents were on the
periphery of WMD activities, providing some useful information. We
had access to émigrés and defectors with more direct access to WMD
programs and we had a steady stream of reporting with access to the
Iraqi leadership come to us from a trusted foreign partner. Other
partners provided important information. What we did not collect
ourselves, we evaluated as carefully as we could. Still, the lack of
direct access to some of these sources created some risk - such is
the nature of our business. To be sure, we had difficulty penetrating
the Iraqi regime with human sources, but a blanket indictment of our
human intelligence around the world is simply wrong. We have spent
the last seven years rebuilding our clandestine service.

As Director of Central Intelligence, this has been my highest
priority. When I came to the CIA in the mid-90s our graduating class
of case officers was unbelievably low. Now, after years of rebuilding
our training programs and putting our best efforts to recruit the
most talented men and women, we are graduating more clandestine
officers than at any time in CIA's history. It will take an
additional five years to finish the job of rebuilding our clandestine
service, but the results so far have been obvious: A CIA spy led us
to Khalid Sheik Muhammad, the mastermind of Al Qa'ida's September
11th attacks. Al Qa'ida's operational chief in the Persian Gulf,
Nashiri the man who planned an executed the bombing of the USS COLE -
was located and arrested based on our human reporting. Human sources
were critical to the capture of Hambali, the chief terrorist in South
Asia. His organization killed hundreds of people when they bombed a
nightclub in Bali. So when you hear pundits say that we have no human
intelligence capability . they don't know what they are talking
about.







It's important that I address these misstatements because the
American people must know just how reliable American intelligence is
on the threats that confront our nation.


Let's talk about Libya where a sitting regime has volunteered to
dismantle its Weapons of Mass Destruction programs. This was an
intelligence success. Why? Because American and British intelligence
officers understood the Libyan programs.


Only through intelligence did we know each of the major programs
Libya had going. Only through intelligence did we know when Libya
started its first nuclear weapon program, and then put it on the
backburner for years.


Only through intelligence did we know when the nuclear program took
off again. We knew because we had penetrated Libya's foreign supplier
network.


And through intelligence last fall when Libya was to receive a supply
of centrifuge parts-we worked with foreign partners to locate and
stop the shipment.


Intelligence also knew that Libya was working with North Korea to get
longer-range ballistic missiles. And we learned all of this through
the powerful combination of technical intelligence, careful and
painstaking analytic work, operational daring, and, yes, the classic
kind of human intelligence that people have led you to believe that
we no longer have. This was critical when the Libyans approached
British and US intelligence about dismantling their chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons programs. They came to the British and
American intelligence because they knew we could keep the
negotiations secret.


And in repeated talks, when CIA officers were the only official
Americans in Libya, we and our British colleagues made clear just how
much insight we had into their WMD and missile programs. When they
said they would show us their SCUD-B's, we said fine but we want to
examine your longer range SCUD-Cs.


It was only when we convinced them we knew Libya's nuclear program
was a weapons program, that they showed us their weapon design.


As should be clear to you, Intelligence was the key that opened the
door to Libya's clandestine programs. Let me briefly mention Iran. I
cannot go into detail. I want to assure you that recent Iranian
admissions about their nuclear programs validate our intelligence
assessments. It is flat wrong to say that we were "surprised" by
reports from the Iranian opposition last year. And on North Korea, it
was patient analysis of difficult-to-obtain information that allowed
our diplomats to confront the North Korean regime about their pursuit
of a different route to a nuclear weapon that violated international
agreements.


One final spy story:


Last year in my annual World Wide Threat testimony before Congress in
open session, I talked about the emerging threat from private
proliferators, especially nuclear brokers. I was cryptic about this
in public, but I can tell you now that I was talking about A.Q. Khan.
His network was shaving years off the nuclear weapons development
timelines of several states including Libya. Now, as you know from
the news coming out of Pakistan, Khan and his network have been dealt
a crushing blow, with several of his senior officers in custody.
Malaysian authorities have shut down one of the network's largest
plants. His network is now answering to the world for years of
nuclear profiteering. What did intelligence have to do with this?
First, we discovered the extent of Khan's hidden network. We tagged
the proliferators. We detected the network stretching from Pakistan
to Europe to the Middle East to Asia offering its wares to countries
like North Korea and Iran.


Working with our British colleagues we pieced together the picture of
the network, revealing its subsidiaries, scientists, front companies,
agents, finances, and manufacturing plants on three continents.


Our spies penetrated the network through a series of daring
operations over several years. Through this unrelenting effort we
confirmed the network was delivering such things as illicit uranium
enrichment centrifuges.


And as you heard me say on the Libya case, we stopped deliveries of
prohibited material. I welcome the President's Commission looking
into proliferation. We have a record and a story to tell and we want
to tell it to those willing to listen.





I came here today to discuss our prewar estimate on Iraq and how we
have followed Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction
programs for well over ten years. It is absolutely essential to do so
openly and honestly.


I have argued for patience as we continue to learn the truth. We are
no where near the end of our work in Iraq, we need more time. I have
told you where we are and where our performance can be improved.


Our analysts at the end of the day have a duty to inform and warn.
They did so honestly and with integrity when making judgments about
the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein. Simply assessing stacks of
reports does not speak to the wisdom experienced analysts brought to
bear on a difficult and deceptive subject.


But as all these reviews are underway, we must take care. We cannot
afford an environment to develop where analysts are afraid to make a
call. Where judgments are held back because analysts fear they will
be wrong. Their work and these judgments make vital contributions to
our nation's security. I came here today also to tell the American
people that they must know that they are served by dedicated,
courageous professionals.


It is evident on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq.


It is evident by their work against proliferators.


And it is evident by the fact that well over two thirds of al-
Qa'ida's leaders can no longer hurt the American people.


We are a community that some thought would not be needed at the end
of the Cold War.


We have systematically been rebuilding all of our disciplines with a
focused strategy and care.


Our strategy for the future is based on achieving capabilities that
will provide the kind of intelligence the country deserves. The
President has ensured that this will be the case.


We constantly learn and improve.


And at no time, will we allow our integrity or our willingness to
make the tough calls be compromised.

we could use some more members

http://ic-humint.d6g.net

Sean Elias

Training dates for 2004.

A quick up date on the training courses developed for operating in
hostile environments. Trojan Securities is currently providing high
level security training, its mainly designed for exsisting security
professionals, indivduals and groups. We have been busy with
military PSD training in the United States, which is becoming a
large part of our training solutions.

We have the course dates through the year, which are as follows, the
next course is April 19th - 28th, ten days at the training facility
in Little Rock, Arkansas.

If anyone enquires from the forum, we will give a discount. If you
have any questions please feel free to get in touch.

Kind regards, Darren Franklin
CO, Trojan Securities
www.trojansecurities.com

My name is Justin Tkacik.

I am very interested in the intelligence field.

Although I am interested in everything, I realize I need a logical
approach.

If you post or e-mail me back please try to touch on these points:

What field are you addressing.
What skills do you need to start an entry-level position.
What is the potential for advancement.

Thank you for your time in this matter,
Justin Tkacik
justintkacik@...

Justin, the hardest thing about the intel world is you
need to get a clearance. Many companies don't want to
put up the time to get one for someone. If you have a
clearance, regardless if it is Secret or above, than
you can easily get employment. Many companies will
also want you to have BA/BS or higher, but that isn't
always a need.

I would say to look into going oversea. Only oversea
will you get a go understanding of the intel world on
the ground floor. If you have a fear of going oversea
to places like Korea, Qatar, Iraq, etc. Than I would
say, "good luck in getting much." Many of the places
oversea sound worse on the news than they really are.
I have been oversea as a cilivian contractor in the
intel world for nearly a year. I love it over there,
in the middle east and getting paid 100K taxfree is
nice too.

A few companies to look at:
ZKD inc.
Trumph
Dyncorp
CSC
MPRI
McNeil
SM conculting
Anteon
GPS (www.gopaperless.com they don't advertise the jobs
in Qatar, but they have them and they are very good
company... the job is called "ISG Support" or
"Adminastrative Asst.")

I am telling you now... The intel world is nothing
like the movies make it out to be. It is a great deal
of seating around and chilling with your co-workers.

The main thing is getting a clearance. IF you don't
have one. I would say go join the Army or Air Force...
Get an intelligence job with them as a Reservest. Do
the training for the time it takes to complete. It may
take over a year, but it will be so worth it.

I was in the army so I am going to use army job titles
(use www.goarmy.com to look up and understand them
better): 96B, 97B, 97E, 98C, 98G. These are a few that
I would say are good. Which ever you pick; I don't
care if you have to wait or choose another one... Get
a langauge in either Arabic, Russian, or something.
Arabic and Russian are paying major right now and are
in high demand Arabic most of all. Plus it is really
cool live in DLI in northern California.

You can demand what you want from the Army. And nine
out of ten times will get it. If they don't give you
it walk out until they can make it happen.

Regardless which intel field you do, you kind of have
to pay your dues, might as well be doing it through
the milliary.

Now here is why I say go military. You get a clearance
easy, hardest thing to get. You're a Reserve so you
can get another job. If you get one oversea what you
make is tax free and all you have to tell your unit is
that you are deployed oversea and you are working for
the military as a civilian. The unit has no choose,
but to let you go do it. If they get to deployed you
are already deployed and making big money well the
rest of them are making nothing. Plus, you get treated
as a cilivian and not as someone in the military.

If you have any other questions ask.
Billy




--- justintka <justintkacik@...> wrote:
> My name is Justin Tkacik.
>
> I am very interested in the intelligence field.
>
> Although I am interested in everything, I realize I
> need a logical
> approach.
>
> If you post or e-mail me back please try to touch on
> these points:
>
> What field are you addressing.
> What skills do you need to start an entry-level
> position.
> What is the potential for advancement.
>
> Thank you for your time in this matter,
> Justin Tkacik
> justintkacik@...
>
>
>





__________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Win a $20,000 Career Makeover at Yahoo! HotJobs
http://hotjobs.sweepstakes.yahoo.com/careermakeover

i have always wanted to be in the intelligence department
i hope i have come to the right place
could someone please put me through on the basic requirements
needed in pursuing a career in analytical inteligence?

i would aprecitae your help
merci!

The Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies is an organized
research unit of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
(NPSIA), Carleton University. We are unable to correspond with or provide
personal or career guidance to students interested in careers in
Intelligence. Information about International Studies at NPSIA is accessible
at: www.carleton.ca/NPSIA.

	 - MR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------

Professor Martin Rudner,  Ph.D.,
Director,  Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies,
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs,
Carleton University,
Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6
Canada

Tel. (613) 520-2600 Ext. 6659
Fax (613) 520-2889
E-Mail: martin_rudner@...

> ----------
> From:  justintka[SMTP:justintkacik@...]
> Reply To:  Intelligence_Training@yahoogroups.com
> Sent:  Wednesday, April 14, 2004 8:28 AM
> To:  Intelligence_Training@yahoogroups.com
> Subject:  [Intelligence_Training] I need some career help
>
> My name is Justin Tkacik.
>
> I am very interested in the intelligence field.
>
> Although I am interested in everything, I realize I need a logical
> approach.
>
> If you post or e-mail me back please try to touch on these points:
>
> What field are you addressing.
> What skills do you need to start an entry-level position.
> What is the potential for advancement.
>
> Thank you for your time in this matter,
> Justin Tkacik
> justintkacik@...
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>
>
>
>

This is always a good place to start:

http://www.cia.gov/employment/index.html

or

http://www.nsa.gov/programs/employ/homepage.cfm

These pages should give you the general guidelines and requirements.  Note
that people with language skills are always in high demand.  (with an
emphasis on Arabic, Farsi and Urdu these days).  Once you have the
prerequisites, the agency in question will provide you with the training you
need to start your career in intelligence.

If you're British, the MI5 is aggresively canvasing for help.  Also check MI6,
FBI
and DIA for more info.  Remember that these folks tend to keep their
operations and procedures secret, so the amount of juicy info available to the
outsider is negligible.

A great resource for intel info is:

http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp

(The Federation of American Scientists)  Although this won't tell you how to
get into the intel field, there are scores of documents that are very useful for
anyone who wants to familiarize themselves with the world of strategic
security and intelligence.  Hope this helps,   Ivan


--- In Intelligence_Training@yahoogroups.com, HEEHEE0617@A... wrote:
> I too am confused as to what career path and education path to take.  I
> already have a BA in Criminal Justice and Government and Politics and an
MA in
> Government and Politics.  I wanted to do Forensic Psychology but it seems
as if it
> is so limited.  Please advise what coursework is appropriate for intel work.
>
> Thank you

again the hardest is the clearance, once you have that
anything goes. There are other paths a person can take
without going into the military, but they are often
harder, but many government jobs like Secret Service
and others do hire those without clearances, if you
meet their other standards. Even those with clearances
have a hard time getting into them though.


--- HEEHEE0617@... wrote:
> I too am confused as to what career path and
> education path to take.  I
> already have a BA in Criminal Justice and Government
> and Politics and an MA in
> Government and Politics.  I wanted to do Forensic
> Psychology but it seems as if it
> is so limited.  Please advise what coursework is
> appropriate for intel work.
>
> Thank you
>





__________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Win a $20,000 Career Makeover at Yahoo! HotJobs
http://hotjobs.sweepstakes.yahoo.com/careermakeover

The Intelligence Study Centre (North America) will conduct a Strategic
Intelligence & Analysis Course focussed on Border Security and Cross Border
Crime Issues during the period June 7th-18th, 2004, in Vancouver, BC.

The course is designed for managers, intelligence analysts, researchers and
risk management specialists who have a need to develop competencies in the
planning, oversight or conduct of strategic intelligence assessments,
particularly in the context of border security risk and threat issues.

Tuition for the course is Can$1335 (includes 7% GST), which covers the 2
weeks of instruction, the text, study guide, and all related course
materials. Each participant will receive a copy of Don McDowell's
award-winning book "Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners,
Managers and Users" as well as a set of notes pertinent to the course theme
of Border Security and Cross Border Crime Issues.

The course venue will be the Best Western Abercorn Inn, 9260 Bridgeport Rd,
Richmond contactable tollfree at 1-800-6630085, phone 604-2707576 or fax
604-2700001. The Best Western Abercorn Inn is offering an excellent
accommodation rate of Can$80 (plus taxes) for course attendees.  Room
bookings should be organized prior to May 24th, 2004 to guarantee this rate.

To obtain a course brochure or register for the course, please contact the
Intelligence Study Centre (North America) at 905 775-5362 or via email
address intstudycen_na@...

Howard Clarke
Director, ISC (NA) Inc.
http://www.intstudycen.com

APRENDA COMO TRANSFORMAR CONHECIMENTO EM VANTAGEM COMPETITIVA


O Curso "Implantando Inteligência Competitiva na Prática" é o primeiro
curso de extensão universitária em IC que apresenta a teoria aplicada à
prática nas organizações brasileiras.

Se você deseja:
· Aprofundar seus conhecimentos em Inteligência Competitiva (IC)
· Inserir sua área no processo de decisões da empresa
· Queimar etapas e apresentar resultados num prazo mais curto
· Se atualizar sobre as principais técnicas de coleta pela internet e
potencializar o uso das redes de relacionamentos
· Dar um upgrade em suas análises
· Gerar relatórios e apresentações que causem impacto
· Conhecer as ferramentas mais úteis para IC


Nas 160 hs do programa você irá aprender a planejar, implantar e gerir o
processo de IC usando metodologias modernas e muita criatividade. A ênfase
é na aplicação prática garantida pelas discussões em aula, estudos de
casos e pelos instrutores que têm experiência comprovada no gerenciamento
de unidades de IC

A qualidade do curso é certificada pelo IPT-FIPT, uma das mais renomadas
instituições de pesquisa do Brasil.

Invista em sua carreira! Este curso é a melhor oportunidade para você se
especializar numa atividade que está em franco crescimento no mundo.

Garanta já a sua vaga. Ligue (011) 3145-1689 e fale com a Srta Cristina.

Para descontos e mais informações acesse o site
www.mkmconsulting.com.br/ic

Não fique em dúvida. Se você tem alguma dificuldade para participar, ligue
que faremos o máximo para viabilizar sua presença.

Matrículas até 22 de maio
Início dia 5 de junho
Aulas aos Sábados

* Você está recebendo este e-mail pelo mailing da IBC que apoia este
evento.

----- Original Message -----

From: Philip Davies

To: Intelligence_Training@yahoogroups.com

Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 12:38 AM

Subject: [Intelligence_Training] Intelligence Training

For what it is worth, Brunel University in the UK is about to start up an MA on Intelligence and Security Studies.  MA/ISS will be management and analysis-oriented, covering joint assessment skills as well as agency and community management issues and the usual foundation in intelligence history and security studies.

 

PHJD

_____________________________________
Dr. Philip H.J. Davies
Deputy Director,
Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies
www.brunel.ac.uk/research/BCISS/
School of International Studies
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Middlesex UB8 3PH
Tel: +44 (0) 1895 247 000 x 4535
Fax: +44 (0) 1895 281 295

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: HEEHEE0617@... [mailto:HEEHEE0617@...]
Sent: 04 May 2004 17:04
To: Intelligence_Training@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [Intelligence_Training] Digest Number 18

I too am confused as to what career path and education path to take.  I already have a BA in Criminal Justice and Government and Politics and an MA in Government and Politics.  I wanted to do Forensic Psychology but it seems as if it is so limited.  Please advise what coursework is appropriate for intel work.

 

Thank you

For what it is worth, Brunel University in the UK is about to start up an MA on Intelligence and Security Studies.  MA/ISS will be management and analysis-oriented, covering joint assessment skills as well as agency and community management issues and the usual foundation in intelligence history and security studies.

 

PHJD

_____________________________________
Dr. Philip H.J. Davies
Deputy Director,
Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies
www.brunel.ac.uk/research/BCISS/
School of International Studies
Brunel University
Uxbridge
Middlesex UB8 3PH
Tel: +44 (0) 1895 247 000 x 4535
Fax: +44 (0) 1895 281 295

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: HEEHEE0617@... [mailto:HEEHEE0617@...]
Sent: 04 May 2004 17:04
To: Intelligence_Training@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [Intelligence_Training] Digest Number 18

I too am confused as to what career path and education path to take.  I already have a BA in Criminal Justice and Government and Politics and an MA in Government and Politics.  I wanted to do Forensic Psychology but it seems as if it is so limited.  Please advise what coursework is appropriate for intel work.

 

Thank you

Dear All

First I started with Transactional analysis and then
it was HPT, now TIME MANAGEMENT.

Long gap is due to my computer crash where in I lost
all my files save nothing.  If you have some of my
file copies pls send it back to me

I think the file, now attached, may be of much use.

with regards
C Jalasayanan




__________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
Friends.  Fun.  Try the all-new Yahoo! Messenger.
http://messenger.yahoo.com/

Hello my name is Eliza and I am from VA.  I found your group when
searching at yahoogroups.com.  I am interested in this career and am
trying to secure my first position.  Hello to everyone here and have
a nice day.  If any of you have any questions or need any help, feel
free to email me.