Thanks for your response Grant.

--- Grant Sterling <gcsterling@...> wrote:
>          No, I have not proposed that [intuitions] are a type of
_perception_
> of objective ethical facts.  I think they're a type of _direct
acquaintance_
> with such facts.  Perception involves some sort of _medium_, something
> in between the mind and its external object.  No perception could
ever be
> certain.
------------------------------------

This is highly interesting to me. I had thought before you were
thinking of intuition as a sort of perception by which we could
perceive ethical truths. Instead, you say it is a "type of direct
acquaintance". But I have no idea what that means. What does it mean
for something to have a direct acquaintance? I would really like to
understand that notion better.

Thanks :)
Daniel

At 10:04 AM 10/1/2008, Daniel wrote:
>Thanks for your response Grant.
>
>--- Grant Sterling <gcsterling@...> wrote:
> >          No, I have not proposed that [intuitions] are a type of
>_perception_
> > of objective ethical facts.  I think they're a type of _direct
>acquaintance_
> > with such facts.  Perception involves some sort of _medium_, something
> > in between the mind and its external object.  No perception could
>ever be
> > certain.
>------------------------------------
>
>This is highly interesting to me. I had thought before you were
>thinking of intuition as a sort of perception by which we could
>perceive ethical truths. Instead, you say it is a "type of direct
>acquaintance". But I have no idea what that means. What does it mean
>for something to have a direct acquaintance? I would really like to
>understand that notion better.
>
>Thanks :)
>Daniel

          Let's start with a perceptual case.  I have the mental experience
of "seeing a chair", and I infer from this that there is a chair in the room.
The chair is an external object, and I am not in any sort of _direct_
contact with its nature.  I can only hope that the contents of my mind
when having this sensory experience "match up" with an actual
external chair.  Skeptical arguments always focus on driving a wedge
between those two states--why should we suppose that the thoughts in
our minds _ever_ "match up" with an external reality, when we can
_never_ access that external reality?  [Note, as I said, that these arguments
can be designed not merely to call into question whether we can ever
be _certain_ that they match up, but whether we ever even have the
slightest reason to suppose that they do.]
          But now turn to the mental experience itself.  I know, with certainty,
that I am having the mental experience of "seeing a chair".  How do I know
that?  Not because I am having a mental experience of "seeing the mental
experience of 'seeing a chair'".  I have no such complex second-order
experience.  Rather, I am in direct contact with the fact that I am having
such an experience.  There's no "gap" between my mind and the fact
of having the experience--I am directly acquainted with the fact.  {Were this
not so, then the skeptic achieves total victory, since no scientist can
ever claim to be justified in believing in some external phenomenon if
neither he nor anyone else can ever claim to be justified in any belief about
what sensory experiences they're having when they make observations!
Note that I don't claim to believe in direct acquaintance with my mental
states because it will help refute the skeptic--that's just a bonus.}
          As I said in my over-long response, this isn't enough for justified
beliefs.  I also need, for example, some principle that says "the mental
experience of seeming to see something makes it reasonable for you
to believe that the something actually exists".  Otherwise we have _no_
justified beliefs about _any_ external object or phenomenon.  But what
justifies this principle?  It cannot be justified by an empirical inference.
[I cannot say "I know from past experience that my mental states
usually match up with the actual external physical realities", since I
never have access to those alleged realities in order to match them
up.  Etc.]  The best response is to hold that we're directly acquainted
with them--that is, our minds can access them without intermediaries.
We can know directly that some kinds of experiences and evidence
justify some kinds of conclusions.  {{{If you really want a long discussion
of this, one of Richard Fumerton's books discusses it.  "Metaphysical and
Epistemological Problems of Perception", I think it was.}}}  If you
want a simpler case, consider a basic rule of logic, such a modus
ponens.  From "If today is Wednesday, then I have lunch with the
Physics professors scheduled" and "Today is Wednesday", I can
validly deduce "I have lunch with the Physics professors scheduled".
Why should we think this is a valid deduction?  It seems to me
the answer is _I can directly knows that it's true_.  I am not convinced that
this inference (modus ponens) is valid because someone has done some
study and shown that the consequent is always true when the antecedent
and the conditional are true.  I am not convinced by the authority of the
logic professors.  (We've already seen that I think the logic professors get
some things wrong.)  I am convinced because I can "see" that it's true,
but not in the mediated fallible indirect way that I perceptually "see" things.
          By the same token, I am convinced that "ceteris paribus one
ought not break one's promises" not because I have some body of
evidence that proves that in most cases promise-breaking causes
bad results, nor because other people or society say it's so.  I am
convinced because I can "see" directly that this is true.  I am
directly acquainted with the fact that promise-breaking is a negative
moral consideration for choice.

          Regards,
                  Grant

THE CONUNDRUM:

If the wise person does not receive distress from the things he cannot control, and if that includes past actions, then that alone should be enough to provide contentment. HOWEVER, why then should it make a difference to our contentment that we make wise/virtuous decision or whether we make unwise/vicious ones?  When we look back over that collection of past choices, and we lump them into that which is out of our control, then all of them are equally Indifferent.

If, on the one hand, we say that our past choices *do* effect our contentment, then we will be able to make the argument that it matters whether or not we make wise/virtuous choices. BUT, we will not be able to then say that we shouldn't fret over our past actions which are now out of our control.

Thanks :)
Daniel

Any question such as "why would it make a difference to our contentment
that we make wise decisions?" calls into question the integrity of the
person asking the question. One possible response (although one more
appropriate to a Cynic than a Stoic) would be to bite the person who
asked the question on the leg (a good bite - one that incapacitates the
victim so that no immediate retribution is possible), and then to
announce that the attack is now in the past, and that the attacker has
no control over what is in the past, and, therefore, has not regrets
concerning it.

It would then be left as an exercise to the person bitten to find the
flaw in his own logic - but now with the advantage of a clearer idea of
what is at stake.

Curt

Daniel wrote:
> I was thinking about Stoicism and some other things recently, and I've
> come across an interesting conundrum that probably points to some
> failure of understanding on my part rather than a conundrum inherent in
> Stoicism. You help is much appreciated...
>
>
> 1) CONTROL & PAST CHOICES
>
> First, I was dwelling on some things I have done in the past and
> experiencing aggravation that I hadn't made as wise and good of choices
> as I should have. Then I tried to remind myself to focus on what I can
> control.
>
> As I have said here before, it is not merely our choices that are in our
> control - but only those choices we are making right now in the present.
> We also will have the opportunity to make choices in the future.
> However, choices that I made in the past (even a second ago) are now in
> the past and out of my control. For all practical purposes, they may as
> well be considered the same as the choices made a decade ago, the
> choices of other people, or even the natural events happening on Mars.
> All of these things are equally in that category of "things not in my
> control". Therefore, while it is helpful to examine past choices as well
> as the choices of others for possible lessons about current and future
> choices, it is pointless to fret over that which I cannot control -
> including my past choices.
>
> This all seemed highly in line with stoicism, and perhaps even a pinch
> of Buddhism with the notion that all we have is "right now". It has
> worked to alleviate my aggravation at past failures. But then I thought
> about the following...
>
>
> 2) A CONTENTED LIFE WITHOUT REGRET
>
> I have read that eudaimonia is a flourishing life that includes
> 'contentment'. That the wise and virtuous person aims to make choices
> such that he will have no regrets and this will provide that
> contentment. Professor Michael Sugrue of Princeton University, in a
> lecture* on Marcus Aurelius said that "...Marcus Aurelius intends to
> live a life in which he will not have to feel guilty about anything."
>
>
> THE CONUNDRUM:
>
> If the wise person does not receive distress from the things he cannot
> control, and if that includes past actions, then that alone should be
> enough to provide contentment. HOWEVER, why then should it make a
> difference to our contentment that we make wise/virtuous decision or
> whether we make unwise/vicious ones?  When we look back over that
> collection of past choices, and we lump them into that which is out of
> our control, then all of them are equally Indifferent.
>
> If, on the one hand, we say that our past choices *do* effect our
> contentment, then we will be able to make the argument that it matters
> whether or not we make wise/virtuous choices. BUT, we will not be able
> to then say that we shouldn't fret over our past actions which are now
> out of our control.
>
> But if, on the other hand, we say that our past choices are now out of
> our control and should not cause us distress, this will go a long way
> toward providing contentment, and be consistent with the general stoic
> view on those things outside of our control. BUT, we will then not be
> able to say that it matters to a contented life whether we make virtuous
> or vicious choices.
>
> How should this conundrum between concepts #1 and #2 above be resolved?
>
> Thanks :)
> Daniel
>
>
> NOTES:
>
> * The lecture to which I am referring is in a video I have referenced to
> on my website at humanistcontemplative.blogspot.com
> <http://humanistcontemplative.blogspot.com/2008/06/marcus-aurelius-virtu\
> al-university.html> . The following is from Part 2, time 4:53 to 5:42.
> Note especially the last sentence...
>
> "[Marcus Aurellius] is not afraid of being dead, he's not afraid of
> being in pain, he's not afraid of having people laugh at him, he's only
> afraid of doing what's wrong. He's only afraid of making chaos of his
> soul. Why? Because his soul is the only thing he's completely in control
> of. It's the only thing he's responsible for, and the rest of it is a
> matter of indifference to him. He'll certainly try and perform his
> function as emperor in the best way he possibly can. But there are
> Germans at the border and should they succeed in winning this war, he
> did the best he could, he has no reason to feel guilty, he has no reason
> to feel that this is a difficulty. If for some reason he gets sick,
> well, sickness is part of human life. You accept it as it is, you deal
> with it the best you can, and then you move on. In other words, Marcus
> Aurelius intends to live a life in which he will not have to feel guilty
> about anything."
>
>
>
>

The irony is - the less willing you are to sell your soul, the higher
the price you can get when you eventually do.
;)
Curt

Mark Travis wrote:
> I'd probably sell my soul for contentment--and a jelly donut, of course.
>
>

Thanks much for the responses so far everyone - I hope to see more :)

I will respond to Grant and Curt first, whose answers I have
difficulties with. Then I'll respond to Gich who provided an
illuminating piece, and finally to Nancy, whose answer I think really
opened my eyes and hit the nail on the head. As I mentioned, I hope to
see others' thoughts on this too...

============================
Grant wrote:
        I think that I _should_ feel guilt at the moment that I realize
that I have chosen badly.  Guilt just is, roughly, a correct
evaluation of one's own fault.  If you felt no guilt, that would mean
that you had not recognized that the choice was wrong.  But that
doesn't mean that you should fret, worry, or continue to feel guilt
after that moment of recognition--from that point on, the event should
be "put away" except insofar as it is remembered as a guide to future
action.  The Sage feels no guilt, because he doesn't _continue_ to do
wrong.
=============================

Something about this doesn't quite sit well with me. Something seems
untidy about it. Consider that when I've discussed guilt, I am
discussing a passion that causes distress. Were it not, then Marcus
Aurelius would have no wish to live a life without it. An intellectual
recognition of wrongdoing, and a wish to avert it in the future, is
one thing. But why would a Sage experience distress, even for a
moment?  It sounds like what you've said here is equivalent to saying,
"when I see my former lover with another I may feel anger or jealousy
at the moment I see them, but I will not continue to fret over it and
will then "put it away". This, of course, is insufficient as an
example of stoic sagehood. If the Sage can "feel guilt", even if only
for a moment, that which of the approved sagelike feelings is this
(wish, caution, or joy)? This is why this answer seems a bit slippery
or clumsy to me.  But perhaps there is something else you mean by the
concept of "feeling guilt"? -thanks :)


========================
Curt wrote:
Any question such as "why would it make a difference to our
contentment that we make wise decisions?" calls into question the
integrity of the person asking the question.
========================

Perhaps, but that is an ad hominem distraction from the question and
therefore irrelevant (or at the very least, question begging). In any
case, your response seems to be as if I had asked, "why should we care
about being virtuous?" when in fact that is not at all the point or
question of the post.

========================
Curt wrote:
One possible response (although one more appropriate to a Cynic than a
Stoic) would be to bite the person who asked the question on the leg
(a good bite - one that incapacitates the victim so that no immediate
retribution is possible), and then to announce that the attack is now
in the past, and that the attacker has no control over what is in the
past, and, therefore, has not regrets concerning it.

It would then be left as an exercise to the person bitten to find the
flaw in his own logic - but now with the advantage of a clearer idea
of what is at stake.
========================

So, I can think of three things your suggestion might be meaning to imply:

(1) [If we do wrong to others, they may wish to do wrong in return,
and therefore we should care about vicious actions because of
retribution from others.]
I'd agree this should be a concern of anyone with good sense. However,
it would represent the lowest level of behavioral consciousness, not
too far out of reach for many other lower animals. I'm fairly certain
this mundane level of quid pro quo is not (merely) what the stoics had
in mind when they discuss the contentment that comes from a virtuous
life. Furthermore, the stoics believe that virtue is not merely
*necessary* for happiness (eudaimonia, including contentment) - but
that it is also *sufficient* for happiness. But by this reckoning, we
would not be able to guarantee that good will always be returned for
good. Thus, this is no argument for the kind of 'contentment
regardless of circumstances' of which the stoics speak. Or, you might
have meant this...

(2) [Having experienced the pain of the bite, the bitten person will
then feel disgust at his aggressor seeing that he does not care. This
will serve as an example of how disgusting he himself would be were he
to be of the same nature.]
I doubt stoics would approve of violence to display a point, but more
importantly - I also doubt they would rely on hypothetical violence to
do the same. Furthermore, I don't think they would seek to reinforce
arguments under the threat or fear of emotions such as disgust.
Lastly, I don't think their argument for why we should be virtuous is
because "we would be disgusted with ourselves if we weren't". If
that's the case, then you have chosen the first of the two options I
listed in my original post. That being the case, then we are still
left without any basis for saying we shouldn't fret over past actions.
In fact, this solution seems to magnify that problem. Or, when you say
"a clearer idea of what is at stake" then I think perhaps you meant...

(3) [If we do not care about being virtuous, then society will fall
apart into a barbarous chaos.]
This is likely true, but again it seeks to answer a question never
asked in the post. The question is not, why should we be virtuous. The
question is how to align the two seemingly contradictory principles
that we should not fret over things outside of our control (which
includes past actions) on the one hand, and the other principle (that
living virtuously gives us contentment because we'll have no past
actions to fret over).  Aside from this notion missing the mark, I
also don't get the impression the focus of stoic argument was on
society management. Rather, it was more individually based in terms of
internal maintenance. Stable society would be an emergent benefit that
comes out of that.

But let me know if there was another meaning to your post which I may
have missed - thanks! :)


=========================
Gich wrote:
I haven't been following this thread, so this may be tangential, but
Epictetus definitely considers we should regret non-virtuous past
behaviour as the poem that introduces Discourse 3.10 shows:

Let not the stealing god of sleep surprise,
Nor creep in slumbers on thy weary eyes,
Ere every action of the former day
Strictly thou dost, and righteously survey.
What have I done? In what have I transgressed?
What good, or ill, has this day's life expressed?
Where have I failed in what I ought to do?
If evil were thy deeds, repent and mourn;
If good, rejoice. [Higginson trans.]

Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes
Before each daily action thou hast scanned;
What's done amiss, what done, what left undone;
From first to last examine all, and then
Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice. [Long trans.]
=================================

Thanks so much for this Gich! Aside from the aesthetic enjoyment of it
(especially Higginson's beautiful translation), it has definitely made
an excellent point that the stoics suggested we should have some sort
of regret. Higginson even uses the word "mourn" which seems awfully
passionate to me for a stoic. Long sticks with "blame" which seems
more like an intellectual assignment of category than a feeling. It
would be interesting to know the wider common translations of the
original word used there.

In any case (Jan, I hope you're reading) - could it be that we have
found what, on Jan's original chart, would be the good feeling
contrary to distress?

GOOD FEELINGS     BAD FEELINGS
Wish              Lust
Caution           Fear
Joy               Delight
Mourning(???)     Distress

Perhaps this might be something to which Grant was alluding?

Interesting and I'd love to hear conversation on the proper
translation of that notion mentioned in this poem (blame, regret,
mourn, repentance). But I really think Nancy has given me that "ah
ha!" experience in regards to my conundrum...


===============================
Nancy wrote:

There is, I think, a partial answer to your puzzle in the following
considerations.
1) The Stoics (at least the early Stoics) agree with Aristotle that
the virtues are dispositions (mental habits) that are generated in us
by repeated actions and feeling-events, which correspond (for the
Stoics anyway) to judgments.
2) Contentment, in the sense of freedom from the passions and smooth
flow of life, requires possession of the virtues.
3) Therefore, our past false judgments/vicious choices are not
irrelevant to our present or future contentment.
Having said this, it does not follow that we should compound our past
errors (and increase our misery) by judging that they are, from the
perspective of the present, evils for us.
===============================

Ah ha!
The element I was missing before was *character*. I was focusing only
on actions, be they virtuous/vicious. So, returning to the conundrum
as paraphrased from my original post...


***
If the wise person does not receive distress from the things he cannot
control (including past actions) that should be enough to provide
contentment. HOWEVER, why then should it make a difference to our
contentment that we make wise/virtuous decisions or whether we make
unwise/vicious ones? We seem to have to options:

(A) We can say our past choices *do* affect our contentment. BUT, we
will not be able to then say that we shouldn't fret over our past
actions which are now out of our control.

-OR-

(B) We can say that our past choices are now out of our control and
should not cause us distress. BUT, we will then not be able to say
that it matters to a contented life whether we make virtuous or
vicious choices.


So the answer, as Nancy has made me aware, is the option I hadn't
seen, that both of the first halves (before the BUT) on (A) and (B)
are true:

(C) Our past choices are now out of our control and should not cause
us distress, AND YET, our past choices *do* affect our contentment
BECAUSE our past choices mold our character, and having a virtuous
character is what allows contentment.

This also touches on my 19th Synthophic Precept
(humanistcontemplative.blogspot.com). I'd welcome any commentary or
critique on (C) above. Thank you Nancy and everyone who has responded
so far.

-Daniel


WRAPPING UP:
Just to wrap up, let me address the two latter points made by Nancy...

====================
Nancy wrote:
It's another question whether the human being is so constituted that
she can one moment engage in a false judgment/bad choice and at the
next detach herself so completely from her error that she can
experience smooth flow of life.
====================

Indeed that is another question. It touches on whether or not one can
practice stoicism with perfection. Or, in other words, whether or not
the stoic Sage truly exists. I would say we cannot do anything with
perfection and that includes stoic practice and habit, and therefore
no Sage has ever or will ever exist. But the notion of the Sage is
still highly important as a hypothetical by which to set our aims.
This, because the closer we can approach sagehood, the better off we
are (and I am still so very, very far from that mark of course).


====================
I'm inclined to think that our past judgments leave traces in what I
would call the cognitive unconscious (physically instantiated in our
neural system) and we never entirely free ourselves of those traces. I
suspect that the classical Stoics thought we could, which suggests to
me that they were closet dualists, in spite of their professed
corporealism, or if you like materialism. (They say that human reason
"comes down" from the gods, which suggests that it is radically unlike
the rest of the embodied person. They are picturing it as a distinct
element, i.e., fire, that is radically unlike the other
elements--earth, water, air.)
======================

That would seem to imply that eudaimonia is not possible because no
matter how much we improve we will always harbor scars from our past
misdeeds. Yet, if these things outside of our control cannot be
stoically processed, then others cannot. I tend to think that we can
stoically assess anything outside of our control, including past
misdeeds. The imperfection of human beings comes in that we will not
always be able to do it with 100% perfect consistency. In that regard,
we approach eudaimonia in proportion to our approach of perfect practice.

As for dualism, I think the stoics were both materialists and dualists
at the same time. They seem to believe in a soul, but I believe their
conception of that soul was a physical phenomena - part of this
natural realm. In other words, the soul was merely the scientific
hypothesis of the day concerning thinking creatures. In this regard,
souls were distinct, but something more like we'd think of magnetism
or other invisible yet physical and natural phenomena. I am open to
being stood corrected on that however.

Daniel wrote:
***
If the wise person does not receive distress from the things he cannot
control (including past actions) that should be enough to provide
contentment. HOWEVER, why then should it make a difference to our
contentment that we make wise/virtuous decisions or whether we make
unwise/vicious ones? We seem to have to options:

Kevin:

Daniel, I'd like to answer this with a question of my own, but I'll also answer
my own question. Why should someone say 2+2 is 4 instead of 5?

  My answer is because it is 4 and not 5. Also If I answer 5 I create a division
inside of my own rationality. I think having a rational faculty in which all of
my judgments are consistent is perhaps what it means to be a sage.

Regards

Kevin


(A) We can say our past choices *do* affect our contentment. BUT, we
will not be able to then say that we shouldn't fret over our past
actions which are now out of our control.

-OR-

(B) We can say that our past choices are now out of our control and
should not cause us distress. BUT, we will then not be able to say
that it matters to a contented life whether we make virtuous or
vicious choices.

So the answer, as Nancy has made me aware, is the option I hadn't
seen, that both of the first halves (before the BUT) on (A) and (B)
are true:

(C) Our past choices are now out of our control and should not cause
us distress, AND YET, our past choices *do* affect our contentment
BECAUSE our past choices mold our character, and having a virtuous
character is what allows contentment.

This also touches on my 19th Synthophic Precept
(humanistcontemplat ive.blogspot. com). I'd welcome any commentary or
critique on (C) above. Thank you Nancy and everyone who has responded
so far.

-Daniel

WRAPPING UP:
Just to wrap up, let me address the two latter points made by Nancy...

============ ========
Nancy wrote:
It's another question whether the human being is so constituted that
she can one moment engage in a false judgment/bad choice and at the
next detach herself so completely from her error that she can
experience smooth flow of life.
============ ========

Indeed that is another question. It touches on whether or not one can
practice stoicism with perfection. Or, in other words, whether or not
the stoic Sage truly exists. I would say we cannot do anything with
perfection and that includes stoic practice and habit, and therefore
no Sage has ever or will ever exist. But the notion of the Sage is
still highly important as a hypothetical by which to set our aims.
This, because the closer we can approach sagehood, the better off we
are (and I am still so very, very far from that mark of course).

============ ========
I'm inclined to think that our past judgments leave traces in what I
would call the cognitive unconscious (physically instantiated in our
neural system) and we never entirely free ourselves of those traces. I
suspect that the classical Stoics thought we could, which suggests to
me that they were closet dualists, in spite of their professed
corporealism, or if you like materialism. (They say that human reason
"comes down" from the gods, which suggests that it is radically unlike
the rest of the embodied person. They are picturing it as a distinct
element, i.e., fire, that is radically unlike the other
elements--earth, water, air.)
============ ========= =

That would seem to imply that eudaimonia is not possible because no
matter how much we improve we will always harbor scars from our past
misdeeds. Yet, if these things outside of our control cannot be
stoically processed, then others cannot. I tend to think that we can
stoically assess anything outside of our control, including past
misdeeds. The imperfection of human beings comes in that we will not
always be able to do it with 100% perfect consistency. In that regard,
we approach eudaimonia in proportion to our approach of perfect practice.

As for dualism, I think the stoics were both materialists and dualists
at the same time. They seem to believe in a soul, but I believe their
conception of that soul was a physical phenomena - part of this
natural realm. In other words, the soul was merely the scientific
hypothesis of the day concerning thinking creatures. In this regard,
souls were distinct, but something more like we'd think of magnetism
or other invisible yet physical and natural phenomena. I am open to
being stood corrected on that however.

> Something about this doesn't quite sit well with me. Something seems
> untidy about it. Consider that when I've discussed guilt, I am
> discussing a passion that causes distress. Were it not, then Marcus

   I agree.

> Aurelius would have no wish to live a life without it. An intellectual
> recognition of wrongdoing, and a wish to avert it in the future, is
> one thing. But why would a Sage experience distress, even for a

   But just as the "intellectual recognition" that something is
good is either identical to a desire or necessarily produces
a desire, so too the intellectual recognition that something is
bad necessarily produces an aversion, a negative feeling.

> moment?  It sounds like what you've said here is equivalent to saying,
> "when I see my former lover with another I may feel anger or jealousy
> at the moment I see them, but I will not continue to fret over it and
> will then "put it away". This, of course, is insufficient as an

   But in that case, the distress is caused by the _false_
belief that I have suffered a genuine evil, that I have been
harmed.  When I recognize that I have acted wrongly, then I
recognize _truly_ that I have suffered a genuine evil or
harm.  So it's not appropriate to experience _any_ negative
emotion when confronted with a former lover, but it _is_
appropriate to experience it when I act wrongly.
   But since the harm doesn't endure, there is no need to
continue to feel the guilt after the recognition of the
harm.

> example of stoic sagehood. If the Sage can "feel guilt", even if only

   The Sage can't feel guilt, because the Sage never does anything
wrong, and hence never suffers a real harm.  But the person making
progress must feel guilt, or else he's not making progress (since
he must be falsely judging that his wrong actions weren't really wrong).
   "An uninstructed person will lay the fault of his own bad condition upon
others. Someone just starting instruction will lay the fault on himself.
Some who is perfectly instructed will place blame neither on others nor on
himself."
   The foolish person falsely thinks his harm has been inflicted
on him by someone else.  The person making progress sees that
the harm is self-inflicted.  The Sage never errs, and hence
is never harmed, and so blames neither other people nor himself
(i.e., feels guilt).

> GOOD FEELINGS     BAD FEELINGS
> Wish              Lust
> Caution           Fear
> Joy               Delight
> Mourning(???)     Distress
>
> Perhaps this might be something to which Grant was alluding?

   Guilt (self-blame, whatever) is like a bad tasting but
effective medicine.  It's not a _good_ thing, because if
the perfectly health person takes it he gets only a bad
taste and no benefits.  But if the sick person takes it,
he becomes better off than he was before.  It is the recognition
of harm--not recognizing harm because you are never harmed
is the ideal state, but if you have been harmed recognizing it
is better than failing to see it and persisting.

> So the answer, as Nancy has made me aware, is the option I hadn't

   I think Nancy is Jan....

> seen, that both of the first halves (before the BUT) on (A) and (B)
> are true:
>
> (C) Our past choices are now out of our control and should not cause
> us distress, AND YET, our past choices *do* affect our contentment
> BECAUSE our past choices mold our character, and having a virtuous
> character is what allows contentment.

   Do you think that eudaimonia is to be identified with the
feeling of contentment?  In other words, if I could somehow
feel contentment while leading a life of evil deeds, would I
have eudaimonia?  We both agree, I think, that this is causally
impossible as a matter of human nature, but it seems conceptually
imaginable.  On my view, such a person does not have eudaimonia,
no matter how content they may be with their vice.

> -Daniel

      Regards,
          Grant

Grant,

Yes, I see now that you have a good point when you draw the
distinction between a passion based on a false judgment, and one based
on a true judgment (that my vice is an evil, whereas the activities of
former lovers is an indifferent).

So, this is why MA's only fear is in doing evil. It is the one thing
that can (and, importantly here, should) cause him distress.

But your point about the Sage not doing things to feel guilty about
ducks the point I think. For one, we use the Sage as a guide of the
ideal stoic practice - so that is really what we're asking when we ask
"what would the sage do". In more literal terms, even the sage will
not likely have always been a sage. Therefore, even the sage will have
choices in his past which were vicious.

While you've convinced me that it's stoically proper to feel the
passion of distress in response to a true evil (having made a vicious
choice), that still leaves me wondering why and by what rational we
should let that passion fade? What determines why it should be felt at
first and not later? What determines the proper amount of time or
intensity by which it should be felt? At what point do we tell
ourselves, 'that's enough of that' and put it away. Lastly, and more
importantly, by what mechanism do we accomplish that feat?  The
typical stoic mechanism for dealing with these feelings is to note
that they are not true evils and practice so that our inclinations
deeply accept that over time. But in the case of a true evil, how do
we cope? How do we simply 'decide' to put it away?

If the answer is to recognize that they are now past choices, and have
moved into the realm of an indifferent since they are out of our
control, then why wasn't that true a microsecond after they occurred?

On your other question:
I agree with you that contentment is part of eudaimonia, but not all
of it.

Thanks :)
-Daniel
PS - Jan, if you are the account with the name Nancy on it, sorry for
confusing you.




--- In stoics@yahoogroups.com, Grant Sterling <gcsterling@...> wrote:
>
> > Something about this doesn't quite sit well with me. Something seems
> > untidy about it. Consider that when I've discussed guilt, I am
> > discussing a passion that causes distress. Were it not, then Marcus
>
>   I agree.
>
> > Aurelius would have no wish to live a life without it. An intellectual
> > recognition of wrongdoing, and a wish to avert it in the future, is
> > one thing. But why would a Sage experience distress, even for a
>
>   But just as the "intellectual recognition" that something is
> good is either identical to a desire or necessarily produces
> a desire, so too the intellectual recognition that something is
> bad necessarily produces an aversion, a negative feeling.
>
> > moment?  It sounds like what you've said here is equivalent to saying,
> > "when I see my former lover with another I may feel anger or jealousy
> > at the moment I see them, but I will not continue to fret over it and
> > will then "put it away". This, of course, is insufficient as an
>
>   But in that case, the distress is caused by the _false_
> belief that I have suffered a genuine evil, that I have been
> harmed.  When I recognize that I have acted wrongly, then I
> recognize _truly_ that I have suffered a genuine evil or
> harm.  So it's not appropriate to experience _any_ negative
> emotion when confronted with a former lover, but it _is_
> appropriate to experience it when I act wrongly.
>   But since the harm doesn't endure, there is no need to
> continue to feel the guilt after the recognition of the
> harm.
>
> > example of stoic sagehood. If the Sage can "feel guilt", even if only
>
>   The Sage can't feel guilt, because the Sage never does anything
> wrong, and hence never suffers a real harm.  But the person making
> progress must feel guilt, or else he's not making progress (since
> he must be falsely judging that his wrong actions weren't really wrong).
>   "An uninstructed person will lay the fault of his own bad
condition upon
> others. Someone just starting instruction will lay the fault on
himself.
> Some who is perfectly instructed will place blame neither on others
nor on
> himself."
>   The foolish person falsely thinks his harm has been inflicted
> on him by someone else.  The person making progress sees that
> the harm is self-inflicted.  The Sage never errs, and hence
> is never harmed, and so blames neither other people nor himself
> (i.e., feels guilt).
>
> > GOOD FEELINGS     BAD FEELINGS
> > Wish              Lust
> > Caution           Fear
> > Joy               Delight
> > Mourning(???)     Distress
> >
> > Perhaps this might be something to which Grant was alluding?
>
>   Guilt (self-blame, whatever) is like a bad tasting but
> effective medicine.  It's not a _good_ thing, because if
> the perfectly health person takes it he gets only a bad
> taste and no benefits.  But if the sick person takes it,
> he becomes better off than he was before.  It is the recognition
> of harm--not recognizing harm because you are never harmed
> is the ideal state, but if you have been harmed recognizing it
> is better than failing to see it and persisting.
>
> > So the answer, as Nancy has made me aware, is the option I hadn't
>
>   I think Nancy is Jan....
>
> > seen, that both of the first halves (before the BUT) on (A) and (B)
> > are true:
> >
> > (C) Our past choices are now out of our control and should not cause
> > us distress, AND YET, our past choices *do* affect our contentment
> > BECAUSE our past choices mold our character, and having a virtuous
> > character is what allows contentment.
>
>   Do you think that eudaimonia is to be identified with the
> feeling of contentment?  In other words, if I could somehow
> feel contentment while leading a life of evil deeds, would I
> have eudaimonia?  We both agree, I think, that this is causally
> impossible as a matter of human nature, but it seems conceptually
> imaginable.  On my view, such a person does not have eudaimonia,
> no matter how content they may be with their vice.
>
> > -Daniel
>
>      Regards,
>          Grant
>

----- Original Message -----

From: Kevin

To: stoics@yahoogroups.com

Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2008 3:13 PM

Subject: Re: [stoics] A Conundrum?

Jan, I associate “…actions and feeling-events,” with impulse and desires \ aversions. Did you intend this association? If so, do you think judgments and impulses and desires are all three constitutive of virtue? Regards Kevin --- On Wed, 10/1/08, Nancy Garrett <jan.garrett@insightbb.com> wrote: From: Nancy Garrett <jan.garrett@insightbb.com> Subject: Re: [stoics] A Conundrum? To: stoics@yahoogroups.com Date: Wednesday, October 1, 2008, 11:38 AM There is, I think, a partial answer to your puzzle in the following considerations. 1) The Stoics (at least the early Stoics) agree with Aristotle that the virtues are dispositions (mental habits) that are generated in us by repeated actions and feeling-events, which correspond (for the Stoics anyway) to judgments. 2) Contentment, in the sense of freedom from the passions and smooth flow of life, requires possession of the virtues. 3) Therefore, our past false judgments/vicious choices are not irrelevant to our present or future contentment. Having said this, it does not follow that we should compound our past errors (and increase our misery) by judging that they are, from the perspective of the present, evils for us. It's another question whether the human being is so constituted that she can one moment engage in a false judgment/bad choice and at the next detach herself so completely from her error that she can experience smooth flow of life. I'm inclined to think that our past judgments leave traces in what I would call the cognitive unconscious (physically instantiated in our neural system) and we never entirely free ourselves of those traces. I suspect that the classical Stoics thought we could, which suggests to me that they were closet dualists, in spite of their professed corporealism, or if you like materialism. (They say that human reason "comes down" from the gods, which suggests that it is radically unlike the rest of the embodied person. They are picturing it as a distinct element, i.e., fire, that is radically unlike the other elements--earth, water, air.) ----- Original Message ----- From: Daniel <dtstrain@yahoo. com> Date: Wednesday, October 1, 2008 10:01 Subject: [stoics] A Conundrum? To: stoics@yahoogroups. com > I was thinking about Stoicism and some other things recently, > and I've > come across an interesting conundrum that probably points to some > failure of understanding on my part rather than a conundrum > inherent in > Stoicism. You help is much appreciated. .. > > > 1) CONTROL & PAST CHOICES > > First, I was dwelling on some things I have done in the past and > experiencing aggravation that I hadn't made as wise and good of > choicesas I should have. Then I tried to remind myself to focus > on what I can > control. > > As I have said here before, it is not merely our choices that > are in our > control - but only those choices we are making right now in the > present.We also will have the opportunity to make choices in the > future.However, choices that I made in the past (even a second > ago) are now in > the past and out of my control. For all practical purposes, they > may as > well be considered the same as the choices made a decade ago, the > choices of other people, or even the natural events happening on Mars. > All of these things are equally in that category of "things not > in my > control". Therefore, while it is helpful to examine past choices > as well > as the choices of others for possible lessons about current and future > choices, it is pointless to fret over that which I cannot > control - > including my past choices. > > This all seemed highly in line with stoicism, and perhaps even a pinch > of Buddhism with the notion that all we have is "right now". It has > worked to alleviate my aggravation at past failures. But then I > thoughtabout the following... > > > 2) A CONTENTED LIFE WITHOUT REGRET > > I have read that eudaimonia is a flourishing life that includes > 'contentment' . That the wise and virtuous person aims to make choices > such that he will have no regrets and this will provide that > contentment. Professor Michael Sugrue of Princeton University, > in a > lecture* on Marcus Aurelius said that "...Marcus Aurelius > intends to > live a life in which he will not have to feel guilty about anything." > > > THE CONUNDRUM: > > If the wise person does not receive distress from the things he cannot > control, and if that includes past actions, then that alone > should be > enough to provide contentment. HOWEVER, why then should it make a > difference to our contentment that we make wise/virtuous > decision or > whether we make unwise/vicious ones?  When we look back > over that > collection of past choices, and we lump them into that which is > out of > our control, then all of them are equally Indifferent. > > If, on the one hand, we say that our past choices *do* effect our > contentment, then we will be able to make the argument that it matters > whether or not we make wise/virtuous choices. BUT, we will not > be able > to then say that we shouldn't fret over our past actions which > are now > out of our control. > > But if, on the other hand, we say that our past choices are now > out of > our control and should not cause us distress, this will go a > long way > toward providing contentment, and be consistent with the general stoic > view on those things outside of our control. BUT, we will then > not be > able to say that it matters to a contented life whether we make > virtuousor vicious choices. > > How should this conundrum between concepts #1 and #2 above be > resolved? > Thanks :) > Daniel > > > NOTES: > > * The lecture to which I am referring is in a video I have > referenced to > on my website at humanistcontemplati ve.blogspot. com > <http://humanistcont emplative. blogspot. com/2008/ 06/marcus- > aurelius-virtu\ > al-university. html> . The following is from Part 2, time 4:53 to 5:42. > Note especially the last sentence... > > "[Marcus Aurellius] is not afraid of being dead, he's not afraid of > being in pain, he's not afraid of having people laugh at him, > he's only > afraid of doing what's wrong. He's only afraid of making chaos > of his > soul. Why? Because his soul is the only thing he's completely in > controlof. It's the only thing he's responsible for, and the > rest of it is a > matter of indifference to him. He'll certainly try and perform his > function as emperor in the best way he possibly can. But there are > Germans at the border and should they succeed in winning this > war, he > did the best he could, he has no reason to feel guilty, he has > no reason > to feel that this is a difficulty. If for some reason he gets sick, > well, sickness is part of human life. You accept it as it is, > you deal > with it the best you can, and then you move on. In other words, Marcus > Aurelius intends to live a life in which he will not have to > feel guilty > about anything." > > >

--- In stoics@yahoogroups.com, Kevin <kevin11_c@...> wrote:
> Daniel, I'd like to answer this with a question of my own, but I'll
also answer my own question. Why should someone say 2+2 is 4 instead of 5?
>
>  My answer is because it is 4 and not 5. Also If I answer 5 I create
a division inside of my own rationality. I think having a rational
faculty in which all of my judgments are consistent is perhaps what it
means to be a sage.
---------------------

Sorry Kevin, I don't understand your point. Can you elaborate in
regards to the actual question instead of a metaphor for it?

Thanks,
Daniel

The crux of the Conundrum is the feeling of contentment.  Can we feel
content with ever present visciousness?  If you can then it matters
not to you weather your actions are virtuous or base.  But this is
the definition of a sociopath not a sage.
For a sage would be content because at that particular moment he is
in attunement with his prolepsis emphetoi.  It is only when his
choices are in tune with nature that a person (according to the
Stoics) can truely feel content.  Thus if a vicious action is in
accord with nature (punishing a criminal, defending oneself or
family) it would not interfere with one's tranquility.  If it is not
in accord with nature (stealing from little old ladies) then it would
interfere with our tranquility. Ergo ones present actions are all one
need be concerned with because it matters whether or not you are in
accord with nature now, not if you were in accord with it yesterday.
Remember the Stoics thought that niether the past or the future
actually existed (per Cicero).
Joe

--- In stoics@yahoogroups.com, Kevin <kevin11_c@...> wrote:
>
> I would say that for the general question "why someone should do
the right thing if they can be content no matter what?" The answer is
because it is the right -correct and rational- thing to do. This
sounds stupid I know and maybe it is, but my reasoning is that if a
person has reason to think that x is the right thing to do, but he
desires to do not-x. He necessarily has conflicting judgments. I
speculate that having conflicting judgments prevents one from being a
sage, and I would add it may prevent someone from being content,
unless of course he is a complete sociopath.
>  
> Your option concerning the character of the person says much the
same thing, but my comments are more specific in regards to how I
think it would and does affect my character.
>  
> Regards
>  
> Kevin
>
> --- On Fri, 10/3/08, Daniel <dtstrain@...> wrote:
>
> From: Daniel <dtstrain@...>
> Subject: [stoics] Re: A Conundrum?
> To: stoics@yahoogroups.com
> Date: Friday, October 3, 2008, 2:03 PM
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --- In stoics@yahoogroups. com, Kevin <kevin11_c@ ..> wrote:
> > Daniel, I'd like to answer this with a question of my own, but
I'll
> also answer my own question. Why should someone say 2+2 is 4
instead of 5?
> >
> > My answer is because it is 4 and not 5. Also If I answer 5 I
create
> a division inside of my own rationality. I think having a rational
> faculty in which all of my judgments are consistent is perhaps what
it
> means to be a sage.
> ------------ ---------
>
> Sorry Kevin, I don't understand your point. Can you elaborate in
> regards to the actual question instead of a metaphor for it?
>
> Thanks,
> Daniel
>

OOPS! Sorry about the spelling errors...i have no excuse but that
I've not been using my head for much but holding down my body lately.
Joe

--- In stoics@yahoogroups.com, "psycherationis" <psycherationis@...>
wrote:
>
> The crux of the Conundrum is the feeling of contentment.  Can we
feel
> content with ever present visciousness?  If you can then it matters
> not to you weather your actions are virtuous or base.  But this is
> the definition of a sociopath not a sage.
> For a sage would be content because at that particular moment he is
> in attunement with his prolepsis emphetoi.  It is only when his
> choices are in tune with nature that a person (according to the
> Stoics) can truely feel content.  Thus if a vicious action is in
> accord with nature (punishing a criminal, defending oneself or
> family) it would not interfere with one's tranquility.  If it is
not
> in accord with nature (stealing from little old ladies) then it
would
> interfere with our tranquility. Ergo ones present actions are all
one
> need be concerned with because it matters whether or not you are in
> accord with nature now, not if you were in accord with it
yesterday.
> Remember the Stoics thought that niether the past or the future
> actually existed (per Cicero).
> Joe
>
> --- In stoics@yahoogroups.com, Kevin <kevin11_c@> wrote:
> >
> > I would say that for the general question "why someone should do
> the right thing if they can be content no matter what?" The answer
is
> because it is the right -correct and rational- thing to do. This
> sounds stupid I know and maybe it is, but my reasoning is that if a
> person has reason to think that x is the right thing to do, but he
> desires to do not-x. He necessarily has conflicting judgments. I
> speculate that having conflicting judgments prevents one from being
a
> sage, and I would add it may prevent someone from being content,
> unless of course he is a complete sociopath.
> >  
> > Your option concerning the character of the person says much the
> same thing, but my comments are more specific in regards to how I
> think it would and does affect my character.
> >  
> > Regards
> >  
> > Kevin
> >
> > --- On Fri, 10/3/08, Daniel <dtstrain@> wrote:
> >
> > From: Daniel <dtstrain@>
> > Subject: [stoics] Re: A Conundrum?
> > To: stoics@yahoogroups.com
> > Date: Friday, October 3, 2008, 2:03 PM
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --- In stoics@yahoogroups. com, Kevin <kevin11_c@ ..> wrote:
> > > Daniel, I'd like to answer this with a question of my own, but
> I'll
> > also answer my own question. Why should someone say 2+2 is 4
> instead of 5?
> > >
> > > My answer is because it is 4 and not 5. Also If I answer 5 I
> create
> > a division inside of my own rationality. I think having a rational
> > faculty in which all of my judgments are consistent is perhaps
what
> it
> > means to be a sage.
> > ------------ ---------
> >
> > Sorry Kevin, I don't understand your point. Can you elaborate in
> > regards to the actual question instead of a metaphor for it?
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Daniel
> >
>

psycherationis wrote:
> Ergo ones present actions are all one
> need be concerned with because it matters whether or not you are in
> accord with nature now, not if you were in accord with it yesterday.
> Remember the Stoics thought that niether the past or the future
> actually existed (per Cicero).
>

Certainly no ancient Stoic philosopher, or for that matter Cicero (a
Platonist, not a Stoic - but an important source for Stoicism), ever
said that our past actions should not concern us. They simply never said
any such thing. Period.

Curt Steinmetz

----- Original Message -----

From: Curt Steinmetz

To: stoics@yahoogroups.com

Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2008 10:30 PM

Subject: Re: [stoics] Re: A Conundrum?

psycherationis wrote:
> Ergo ones present actions are all one
> need be concerned with because it matters whether or not you are in
> accord with nature now, not if you were in accord with it yesterday.
> Remember the Stoics thought that niether the past or the future
> actually existed (per Cicero).
>

Certainly no ancient Stoic philosopher, or for that matter Cicero (a
Platonist, not a Stoic - but an important source for Stoicism), ever
said that our past actions should not concern us. They simply never said
any such thing. Period.

Curt Steinmetz

My memory of the texts fails me at the moment. I'm not sure if I can
find an example of a stoic speaking speciffically of the lack of import
of our past, but I shall begin to look.

However there are many examples in Epictetus of the importance of
focusing on the present.  1.4.11 is quite a good example in that all
the things that Epictetus lists as our work have to do with preparing
our mind to judge perceptions that occur to us at each moment.

Seneca speaks of the import of our past actions only in that we build
habits that lead us either to virtue or to vice.  Thus in his opionion
it was more difficult for someone with a lot of viceful baggage to
become virtuous but not impossible (which i read as meaning that our
present actions are more important then our past ones).  Let us not
forget who he wrote De Ira for!
Joe

--- In stoics@yahoogroups.com, Curt Steinmetz <curt@...> wrote:
>
> psycherationis wrote:
> > Ergo ones present actions are all one
> > need be concerned with because it matters whether or not you are in
> > accord with nature now, not if you were in accord with it
yesterday.
> > Remember the Stoics thought that niether the past or the future
> > actually existed (per Cicero).
> >
>
> Certainly no ancient Stoic philosopher, or for that matter Cicero (a
> Platonist, not a Stoic - but an important source for Stoicism), ever
> said that our past actions should not concern us. They simply never
said
> any such thing. Period.
>
> Curt Steinmetz
>

On Margaret Graver's website ( she is the author of the 2007
book "Stoics and Emotion') she mentions the she and A. A. Long are co-
authoring a new full annotated translation of Seneca's "Moral
Epistles".  This will be the first full translation in English in close
to 100 years.  There is no indication on when to expect publication.  I
will apparently be published by the University of Chicago Press.

Anyone up for trying Musonius Rufus?

--- In stoics@yahoogroups.com, Kevin <kevin11_c@...> wrote:
> I would say that for the general question "why someone should do the
right thing if they can be content no matter what?" The answer is
because it is the right -correct and rational- thing to do.
------------------------

Yes, Grant takes this line of argument as well. He has said that the
question, "why should I do what I should do?" is meaningless because,
by definition, we are talking about "what we should do".

However, I think this only seems meaningless because we are using the
same phrasing that gets overlapped, which doesn't actually have the
same meaning. When I ask, "Why should I do x?" this is a different
sort of question that the one that is answered by the ethical pursuit
of the question, "what should we do?". The first question is asking
something like, "what's in it for me?" and/or perhaps, "what is my
incentive?", or even "why should I care if I didn't do x?". So, the
question isn't "why is it virtuous to be virtuous?" Rather, the
question is "why is it wise to be virtuous?"

Now, these sorts of questions may be easily dismissed as 'hopelessly
selfish' or even 'evil' by the ethical philosopher, who has already
taken upon himself to commit to an ethical pursuit, and has moved on
to the nuts and bolts of ethics. However, I think that attitude toward
the question is a huge mistake. For, it is the very foundational
question of all ethics - it is the one that even a child would begin
with - and would be right for doing so. If it cannot be answered, then
there truly is no foundation for the entire field or pursuit of
ethics, short of arbitrary enforced social embarrassment or emotional
pressure against those who would ask such a thing. More importantly,
those who regard the question is irrelevant, silly, confrontational,
or anti-ethical do so because of a shortcoming of their own in
understanding ethics, in that they tend to think of it as a
sacrificial obligation rather than a wise practice.

Rather, I think a better approach is to recognize that *ethics is good
for us*, and that ethics exist for *our* sake. Further, to understand
just how and why ethics is good for us. Then we can not only answer
that foundational question of why it is wise to be virtuous, but will
understand more about ethics going all the way up from that
foundation, throughout our philosophy. To mistake this all-important
question for the sort of base-selfishness that is indicative of a lack
of ethics is to miss the point, that there is an enlightened
selfishness at the core of the noblest of human activity, which is
deeper and more profound. The news that ethics is in our self
interests is surprising to most, and it is *good news* - it is a
valuable and highly important lesson to understand and to not
understand it is harmful.

In short, the response quoted above is no more useful or serious than
"because I said so", which is entirely unacceptable.


----- Kevin wrote: ---------------------
  This sounds stupid I know and maybe it is, but my reasoning is that
if a person has reason to think that x is the right thing to do, but
he desires to do not-x. He necessarily has conflicting judgments. I
speculate that having conflicting judgments prevents one from being a
sage, and I would add it may prevent someone from being content,
unless of course he is a complete sociopath.
----------------------------------------

Absolutely agreed. The reason this is a misjudgment is because their
desire to do not-x comes from the belief that not-x is beneficial to
them, while at the same time x is beneficial.

Now, we know that people face continual temptation to be vicious. So,
the conundrum is about why viciousness is not to our benefit. When we
know that, we will know the nature of the misjudgment. In an effort to
help us explain it, I will argue the opposite so that it can be
assaulted...


If, once a vicious act enters into the past (even a second ago) it is
now out of our control, then it should be an Indifferent for that
reason. Thus, we should not feel distress over an Indifferent. That
would be to suffer from a delusional misjudgment that something out of
our control (our past choices in this case) is actually in our control
- which is false. To suffer distress from this would be the same as to
suffer distress from any number of other Indifferents out of our
control (health, wealth, friends, etc).

Furthermore, we cannot say that we should wish to avert ourselves from
vicious choices because we know that we will experience distress in
the future if we choose viciously - because we will know that those
choices will pass into the past the moment we make them, and thus
become Indifferents, yielding no distress for the stoic practitioner.

Now let's consider our character as Jan has suggested. Let us assume
that making virtuous or vicious choices helps to mold our character in
those respective directions.  Now, Jan's premise is that it is the
virtuous character that allows for contentment, and the vicious one
that does not. But why?

I had always assumed that the reason a person of vicious character
cannot enjoy contentment would be because they would be more highly
tempted to make vicious choices in the future and have a difficult
time making virtuous choices, and it is *those choices* which then
provide either a life of contentment or one of distress. So, that
brings us back to choices.

If this is not so then how is it, by stoic reasoning, that character
directly provides contentment without respect to the psychological
impact of particular vicious and virtuous choices?

One last note, which should be a no-brainer for us here: we cannot say
a good reason is that people of a virtuous character will be more
likely to enjoy more fruitful relationships and experiences in
external life conditions because, while that may be true, all of those
external things are but Indifferents - and not the goods upon which
stoic contentment rest.

I suspect the correct answer will be that vicious actions really do
scar us, burdening our conscience since we are social animals and such
behavior is against our Nature. This necessarily harms our ability to
achieve contentment in life. But if this is the answer, then I'm still
left wondering how (in a precise manner without internal logical
contradiction) to deal with past viciousness in a way that allows a
continued pursuit of contentment while not denying the
contentment-destroying nature of vicious acts.


Thanks,
Daniel

> On Margaret Graver's website ( she is the author of the 2007
> book "Stoics and Emotion') she mentions the she and A. A. Long are co-
> authoring a new full annotated translation of Seneca's "Moral
> Epistles".  This will be the first full translation in English in close
> to 100 years.  There is no indication on when to expect publication.  I
> will apparently be published by the University of Chicago Press.

> Anyone up for trying Musonius Rufus?

I wasn't aware that Rufus's writings were extant, but apparently there are
sayings and lectures recorded by his students.

This is exciting.


.

At 01:00 PM 10/3/2008, Daniel wrote:
>Grant,
>
>While you've convinced me that it's stoically proper to feel the
>passion of distress in response to a true evil (having made a vicious
>choice), that still leaves me wondering why and by what rational we
>should let that passion fade? What determines why it should be felt at

          Suppose someone performs an action at time t.  They must
believe that this action will be good or produce something good.
(This belief may be irrational, but no-one ever aims at something
in an action unless they believe it to be good in some way.)
          If I am the Sage, or even someone making progress towards being
a Sage, I will not perform the action if I see that it is irrational to believe
that anything good will come out of the action, or if I see that the good
that will come is outweighed by the good achievable by some other action I
could perform.
          Suppose I perform the action, and it was an act of vice.  It must be
the case that I had a false value belief, but one that I did not see at the
time was irrational.  If at any subsequent time t2 I still fail to recognize
that it was an act of vice, I will feel no guilt.  But if at some subsequent
time I _do_ realize it, then I recognize that I have been (self-) harmed,
and I feel guilt and regret.
          So at the time that I first realize that I have committed an act of
vice, I ought to feel guilt.  But there's no reason to _continue_ to
feel the passion _after_ the time of recognition.  Indeed, it is the case
that what I need to recognize is that since the action is in the past, it
cannot be altered, and so there's no point feeling the passion for
the harm that I have suffered continually forever.  Even better, I might
some day change my dispositions so much that my new Sage-self is
in some concrete sense no longer the same person that suffered
the old harm.
          Or maybe you prefer the Platonic strategy, which is similar
to Jan's suggestion.  Each act of wrongdoing harms the soul,
and the person making progress seeks to repair the harm and
achieve full health.  Once full health is achieved, then the past
harm no longer exists.

>Thanks :)
>-Daniel

          Regards,
                  Grant

Daniel wrote:


Rather, I think a better approach is to recognize that *ethics is good
for us*, and that ethics exist for *our* sake. Further, to understand
just how and why ethics is good for us. Then we can not only answer
that foundational question of why it is wise to be virtuous, but will
understand more about ethics going all the way up from that
foundation, throughout our philosophy. To mistake this all-important
question for the sort of base-selfishness that is indicative of a lack
of ethics is to miss the point, that there is an enlightened
selfishness at the core of the noblest of human activity, which is
deeper and more profound. The news that ethics is in our self
interests is surprising to most, and it is *good news* - it is a
valuable and highly important lesson to understand and to not
understand it is harmful.

In short, the response quoted above is no more useful or serious than
"because I said so", which is entirely unacceptable.

Kevin:

Let us go back to my arithmetic metaphor. Imagine I told my son when he was
learning to add “2+2 is 4,” to which he says “why,” to which I reply
“see it just is,” holding to fingers on one hand next to my other hand also
holding up two fingers. He-sees- that it is 4. It is just wrong to say 5. Two
and four and addition are all abstract concepts. You can’t pick up “four”
or buy a bag full of “two.”

What I am suggesting (because of Grant blast him) is that ethical choices can be
just like that. In your version the fact that “ethics is good for us” makes
ethics right. This is subjectivist in nature because you are supplying the
value. An objectivist point of view is that the value is already there and we
can recognize it. These two points of view are fundamentally different in my
view.

Regards
Kevin

----- Original Message -----

From: Steven Paul Hamilton

To: stoics@yahoogroups.com

Sent: Monday, October 06, 2008 11:46 AM

Subject: [stoics] New Translation of Seneca's Moral Epistles Coming

On Margaret Graver's website ( she is the author of the 2007
book "Stoics and Emotion') she mentions the she and A. A. Long are co-
authoring a new full annotated translation of Seneca's "Moral
Epistles". This will be the first full translation in English in close
to 100 years. There is no indication on when to expect publication. I
will apparently be published by the University of Chicago Press.

Anyone up for trying Musonius Rufus?

Kevin writes:
______________

What I am suggesting (because of Grant blast him) is that ethical
choices can be just like that. In your version the fact that `ethics
is good for us' [quoting Daniel, SM] makes ethics right. This is
subjectivist in nature because you are supplying the value. An
objectivist point of view is that the value is already there and we
can recognize it. These two points of view are fundamentally
different in my view.
_______________

Kevin, I believe both Daniel's and Grant's approach have merit
because both are part of a larger whole.

I think Daniel is right on is stating that ethics is for our sake.
We cannot but experience and live subjectively.  The mistake that is
made is to immediately set up self concern and other concern in
opposition, indentifying `objective' ethical behavior exclusively
with the later.  That is the trap of the rule followers, for rules
obviously stand in opposition to what the self `wants' to do.  And
this leads to the next trap of accepting authority to define those
rules instead of training one's own reason.

Grant, however, has a better position in regard to objectivity, for
not only is there a claim that there is an objective right and wrong
but a way of knowing what that is; namely intuition.  Daniel's
iterative approach; kind of a cumulative social growth in knowledge
over time about what is better for humans in general, can claim there
is some end point that is objective but never reach it or know it.
How do we cleanly separate that from convention?  Much convention is
pragmatically useful, but not necessarily true or ethical or anything
else.

Instead of asking what is right or the right thing to do I think we
should ask what is the best way to be; or, even more basic, what is
good.  To ask what is right vs wrong is already starting with much
assumed baggage.

What is good for the Stoics is for a given thing to fulfill its
nature.  This seems obvious on the face, and is easily visualized
with imagining what is a healthy tree or a healthy amoeba or a
healthy rock for that matter.  All these things do fulfill their
nature for they cannot choose otherwise.  It is only self aware
things that, ironically because of that vey self awareness, can opt
to not fulfill their own nature.

So rather than burden ethical talk with what is right I like to think
of what is best (ie, what is excellent).  And it most certainly is
what is excellent for the agent making the choice, but from the
highest context of fulfilling one's nature, not immediate
gratification.  That this seems selfish is only reflecting a modern
prejudice.

Fulfilling our nature implies fulfilling our highest nature.  There
are four according to the ancient Greeks; inanimate, animate, animal,
and rational, each with its unique type of soul.  To live up to the
potential of our nature means to fulfill our rational nature even if
that 'seems' in opposition to our lower natures at the moment (ought
vs want).  I like Grants use of `rational' and `irrational' as better
descriptors of what is ethical or not rather than right or wrong for
this reason.

We can see this progression of `natures' in ourselves by noticing the
different mechanisms by which we inform ourselves things are good for
us or not so good.  We can start with simple physical pleasure /
pain, something obviously far advanced already above single celled
organisms, but a crude indicator of what to pursue or avoid
nevertheless.  Next we have psychological pleasure and pain, mostly
in tune with our social surroundings; a more refined but still crude
(I'm thinking of emotions) indicator of what to pursue or avoid.  And
then we have happiness and its opposite, a reflective assessment of
physical and emotional well being over time.  This I see as a
layering on the cruder layers rationality combined with memory etc,
but still with the rational mind serving the lower order (ie,
assenting to false impressions about value).  So even the
Utilitarians get it wrong.  Everyone wants happiness to be sure, but
why???

And the answer is . . . because happiness is yet a more refined
indicator that the agent is close to her own nature.  But that is
just an indicator and the cause and effect reasoning that tells us
what makes us happy can be mistaken.  What all of these indicators
point to is to live according to our nature.  We cross up the
indicators with what the indicators point at all the time.  Now, what
happened to `oughts' and duty?  Well, Stoic duty is none other than
to live in accordance with one's nature.  We can see right away then
that what the selfish ego wants really and what the careful
assessment of what we ought to do both aim at is the very same
thing.  It is a mistake to divorce the pursuit of happiness from
morality; it always has been.

I do not think that `ethics for our sake' ends up as nothing but the
trivial pursuit of wallowing in egoism.  Pursued honestly it will
eventually conclude that the deep true contentment that can only
arise from aręte inherently includes other concern (with reservation
of course), for the agent who is starting to get a handle on his own
self fulfillment finally wishes this for all rational creatures and
makes choices to aid that very thing.  The two; self-fulfillment and
other concern, cannot be separated

It only appears Daniel's approach supplies the value, for it cannot
ever `see' the end.  Nevertheless what it is aimed at is truth about
human nature.  And to do that one must be able to at least visualize
ethics as objective to move in the more rational direction when our
habits of desire wish to move us in some other direction.  This is
basically what the scientific method does with publically sharable
facts.  This visualization (another word for those who do not wish to
admit they have intuition ;)) relies on projecting from current
experience with reason into areas not experienced.  And that relies
on the assumption that the cosmos is rational, that it is all one big
causal nexus, something the Stoics thought a long time ago.

As an aside, philosophical debate, as somewhat practiced right here,
does with reason what science does with physical measurements, it
tempers speculation with assessment from one's fellow moral agents.

And surely I agree with Grant's objectivity with the exception that
there is only one rule or purpose; to fulfill our nature or be
rational.  All those other rules are specific applications of this
one rule.

In the end there can be only one :).

Live well,
Steve

PS I disagree with Grant that we _should_ feel guilt.  Guilt is just
another pathos.  Experiencing guilt is indicative of yet another vice
on top of the vice already committed (if, in fact, what one is
feeling guilty about was truly assent to a false impression to start
with).  Guilt is learned from what others disapprove of, and, as
such, is only the crudest of indicators that one has actually done
wrong.  It is a fact that one has assented to a false impression
whether one feels guilty about it or not.  If we trust this as an
indicator of when we are wrong I think we will tend to forgo careful
examination and go astray.  It is a mistake to trust any pathos, no
matter how well intended, even as a training aid to reduce pathos.